Is there a wage cost of balancing family and work? Evidence using matched employer-employee data

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First draft

Summary

One explanation of the over-representation of women in the public sector is that they have often chosen jobs that are more "family-friendly" (closer to home, with flexible or non-extended working schedule). The economic theory of "hedonic prices" explains the lower female wages by their choice of jobs which help them to reconcile work and family life.
This article examines i) whether the wages are actually lower in the firms that enable their employees to better combine work and family and ii) the weight of these "family friendly" practices in the gender wage gap. It provides a test of the hedonic price theory by studying both the family-friendly measures offered by the companies and the perception of reconciliation between family and work. Various family-friendly practices of employers are distinguished: benefits in kind, financial benefits, and flexible scheduling.
The data used is the French "*Enquête Familles et Employeurs*" (INED, 2005) which is a national matched employee-employer survey that gives a large description of benefits offered by employers.
First, using factor analysis, we make a typology of firms according to the degree of family friendly policies they set up: five groups of firms are found. Second, we observe, as expected, a negative relationship between wages and family benefits, especially in female-dominated firms. Finally, the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition shows that the gender gap is partially explained by these family-friendly practices, used mainly by women. But a part of the gender gap still remains unexplained.

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1. Introduction

Motherhood has been stressed as the main factor of wage inequalities between men and women (Waldfogel, 1997 and 1998). There are several reasons why children might influence their mothers' earnings, and in turn women's wages: children can reduce mothers' productivity because they leave mothers with less energy than men or other women (Becker, 1985) or because mothers spend some time out of the labour market, and consequently to have accumulated less human capital (Mincer & Polachek, 1974). Mothers may also be discriminated on the labour market (*i.e.* statistical discrimination). Mothers are also more likely to have been or to be working part-time, which in turn may reduce work opportunities, or to have chosen jobs or enterprises that are more "family-friendly" (or simply closer to home or school) at the cost of a better pay (Filer, 1985; Felfe, 2006). Recently, employers have been encouraged to implement their own family-friendly policy, new research has emphasized the role of firms in the work-life balance (Evans, OCDE 2002- 2005).

Women do not hold the same jobs as men: they are overrepresented in the public sector and non profitable sector jobs[1]. It may be explained by their higher altruism or their higher level of intrinsic and pro-social motivations. But in France, Lafranchi and al. (2009) find that there is no gender difference in the social motivations of workers, after controlling for various covariates. Another explanation of this gender occupational segregation may come from women preferences for family-friendly jobs.

We will analyse in this article whether wage inequalities between men and women may be explained by the over-representation of women in family friendly occupations. According to the compensating differential theory, mothers are more likely to choose jobs that make it easier to combine family and work life, such as flexible work schedules, convenient working hours, closeness of job to their home, etc. It is at the cost of a lower pay. We will estimate whether family friendly firms offer lower wage to compensate for such amenities.

There are huge differences between firms in terms of family-friendly benefits and services (Lefèvre et al 2008), according to their size, gender composition and sector. These differences make large inequalities between employees. Moreover, firms may be involved into the balance between family and work through different medium: they may allow schedule flexibility, in kind benefits and/or financial benefits.

Studying the effect of family friendly policies on the gender wage gap requires appropriate data sets, especially with regards to the information on the benefits and services offered by companies. Usually this type of information is gathered from the individual. One draw back of this type of data collection is that workers may underestimate the participation of their company – particularly when they are not confronted with the question of work-family balance. It is observed that men underestimate the benefits and services offered by companies (Cornuau, 2009), which bias the analysis of the gender wage gap. Thus, one needs to get such information for the employer point of view. The linked employee-employer dataset we use, the "*Enquête Familles et Employeurs*", collected in France by INED in 2004-2005, is perfectly appropriate for such analysis.

After a short review of the literature (section 2), we present a model applied to our research question (section 3). Then, we present data and method in section 4. In order to build an indicator of family friendly level of firms, we make a typology of firms according to their

[1] Occupational segregation by gender is rather pronounced in France; for instance, the share of women working in the public sector is 33%, and that of men is 22%.

family friendly practices (section 5). This typology synthesise the heterogeneity of tools and practices. This taxonomy is used to evaluate the impact of firms' family friendly policies on the gender wage gap (section 6).

2. Review of the literature

To be written

3. Model

Hedonic price theory also called "theory of equalizing difference", initially formalized by Rosen (1974), shows that the mechanisms of perfect competition lead to compensate workers who work in "more difficult" jobs. By "More difficult" jobs, the theory means some characteristics of the job such as risk-taking, hardness, work schedule (night or week-end work), social stigmatisation… Each worker, according to his/her preferences, is ready to accept "more difficult" if he or she is compensated in terms of wages.

We can reverse the issue by asking the following question: Do "easier" jobs lead to a reduction of wage? Job may be "easier" because of the qualification or competences (human capital theory) or because they offer facilities or fringe benefits. The theory predicts that workers differ in their demand for employer provided benefits. For instance, Olson (2002) show that wives are keen to accept a 20% lower wages in exchange of employer-provided health insurance. Each worker, according to his or her preferences may accept a more family-friendly job in exchange of a wage reduction. Women, for whom the social pressure on family duties is stronger, would accept more easily such jobs in spite of the wage penalty.

Figure 1: Indifference curb and iso-profit curb (U).



Firms go to arbitration between necessary costs to provide family friendly practices and the wage reductions (figure 1) they could do without discouraging workers to accept such jobs.

At the equilibrium:

- each indifference curb is tangent to a iso-profit curb (in perfect competition, the equilibrium is Pareto-optimal)

- iso-profit curbs corresponds to null profit (because of the free market entry assumption)

According to this model, there is a decreasing relation between firm family friendly practices and the level of wages.

4. Data, sample and method

4.1. Data

The originality of our approach is to mix individuals determinants, household determinants and firm determinants thanks to a linked survey of individuals and their firm. The data set used here comes from the Families and Employers Survey conducted by INED in 2004-2005. The objectives of this survey are to describe the work-life balance in France from the point of view of both individuals and employers, and to understand the correlation between the working lives and family behaviours of men and women. The Family section was carried out by means of face-to-face interviews on a sample of approximately 9,500 respondents. The data set contains rich sets of information on individuals and household's background as well as a detailed description of the present work situation. The Employer section took the form of a postal survey to the workplaces of the Family survey respondents (2,673 respondent establishments with over 20 employees). The questionnaire covered the companies' human resources management (work organization, personnel management, working environment and general establishment's characteristics).

One other interest of our dataset is the retrospective information it provides on the individuals' activity status since they turned 18 years old allow to build a variable related to real experience (Meurs et al., 2008).

4.2. Sample

We use the linked sample with both sides, that is to say 3,050 employee aged from 20 to 49, working in a firm with at least 20 employees. We are interested in wage workers and potential workers, so we drop those who were either students or retired or self employed at the time of interview. The population of wage workers is restricted to those who work at least 10 hours per week, in order to avoid as much as possible occasional participation in employment; we also drop those who earn less than 250 euros per months, this threshold corresponding to about the minimum wage for one month of work with at least 10 weekly hours. After excluding individuals with missing information, the sample counts 2679 wage earners (1332 women and 1347 men). Sample characteristics are given in Appendix 1.

4.3. Overview of the method

We proceed in two steps. First, using factor analysis, we make a typology of firms according the degree of 'family friendly policies' they set up. We use about twenty seven questions on schedule flexibility, benefits and services available in the firm. The classification brought out four groups of firms with different social politics. Secondly, those groups are explanatory variables of a wage equations controlled by usual socio-demographic covariates.

5. Typology of firms according their family-friendly policy.

5.1. Method of classification

The aim of the typology is to synthesise the huge amount of information about family-friendly policy that is obtained through the Employer section. It avoids building ad hoc synthetic indicators or constraining the more or less participation of such variable.

For that purpose we run a classification analyse using 27 variables related to the work-family balance. These 27 variables cover in cash and in kind benefits related to children proposed by the firm and the availability of time-table adjustments. Analysis also includes two variables measuring the degree of freedom of part-time practices and the choice of day-off. Table 2 gives their distribution.

We use a mixed method of classification which consists in using first a hierarchical ascending classification followed by a consolidation. The method of hierarchical ascending classification proceeds at grouping together successively classes by aggregation. At each step, two groups made by the preceding iteration are merged. At the first step, the aggregation consists of making n-1 classes, with n the number of individuals. At the second step, n-2 classes are created, and so on.

Table 1: Description of family friendly variables chosen

Variables	Items	Frequency
Number of paid day-off when a child is ill	0 1-3 4-6 >6	32.0 13.4 22.6 32.0
Number of additional weeks-off for maternity leave	0 1-3 >3	92.8 4.5 3.7
The establishment proposes child care	Yes	7.8
The establishment gives access to child camp	Yes	40.2
The establishment offers a birth premium	Yes	65.8
The establishment offers a marriage premium	Yes	42.9
The establishment offers financial benefits for child-care	Yes	27.6
The establishment offers domestic services	Yes	5.7
The establishment offers financial benefits for child studies	Yes	32.0
The establishment offers financial benefits for disabled child	Yes	26.5
Preservation of completed wage during maternity and paternity leave	Yes	70.6
Time-table adjustments for the start of the new school year	Yes	85.9
Time-table adjustments for child schedule (school, kinder garden)	Yes	39.1
Time-table adjustments for child disease	Yes	71.7
Time-table adjustments for long commuting	Yes	23.6
Possibility to work at home for private reasons	Yes	11.9
Part time accepted on employee's demand	No Sometimes Always	8.4 42.61 49.1
Possibility to organise free time (gained by RTT reform)	No Constrained Need agreement Free	19.5 14.7 53.7 12.1

Availability is a requirement to promotion	Never Sometimes Often Always	2.2 34.0 31.4 9.4
Holidays checks	Yes	50.0
The establishment participates to finance health services	For all For executives No	55.0 8.0 37.0
The establishment provides health services	Yes	31.6
Family situation is taken into account … for in the work schedule	Yes for all	10.1
	In certain cases	48.4
	No	35.
	Not applicable	5.9
for moves and assignments	Yes for all	9.01
	In certain cases	35.3
	No	38
	Not applicable	17.7
for internal mobility	Yes for all	12.5
	In certain cases	45.0
	No	26.4
	Not applicable	16.0
for part-time attribution	Yes for all	27.6
	In certain cases	48.4
	No	14.8
	Not applicable	9.2
for day-off organisation	Yes for all	32.6
	In certain cases	51.6
	No	10.7
	Not applicable	5.2

Source: "Familles et Employeurs" INED 2004-2005
Sample: Establishments of 20 employees and more.

5.2. Four groups of firms

4 classes are determined. We obtain the following three.

Figure 2: Classification three



The **class 1** called "no family friendly service, priority to efficiency" regroups half of the establishments (50%). Most of them provide neither benefits for employees' children nor financial benefits or in kind benefits. There is no preservation of the completed wage during maternity and paternity leave (much less provided than in average), no financial benefit for child care (only 2% provide against 27% in average), a disabled child (only 3% provide against 26% in average) or for the child studies (twice less provided).

In kind benefits are also scarcer than elsewhere. This class has the lowest frequency of providing childcare centre or 'leisure centre'. Half of these establishments give no paid day-off in case of child disease, and 14% provide only few days-off. Child holiday camp access is twice less frequent than in average. A very popular measure such as the schedule adjustment allowed the first day of school year is much less widespread in these establishments.

Others advantages, not specially linked to children, such as the participation to finance health services, or the provision of health services are also scarcer, or are only reserved to a particular category, i.e. executives. These measures may be a sort of in kind advantage in order to attract and establish staff loyalty.

Moreover, part time has a limited access, and family situation is not a condition to get it. To sum up, all the measures, whatever the type, that may bother the work organisation are not available in those establishments. Only benefits to attract highly qualified workers are available.

Additional covariates confirm that this type of establishments belong to the private sector. Staff is mostly masculine. Small firms are overrepresented, belonging to industry, construction or trade sector. These establishments usually open 5 days a week and are more likely to be in Paris and its suburbs.

At the opposite side, the **class 2** called "modern paternalism" regroups 32% of firms (and 29% of wage-earners). This kind of establishments provides more than the average different measures for the children of employees, such as a financial benefit for child birth (higher frequency), for childcare expenses (76% of establishments provides this help against only 27% in average), or in case of a disabled child (three times more than in average), or student child (twice more). A high number of paid days-off in case of child illness is offered (20% between 4 and 6 days and 73% more than 6 days a year). The access to child holiday camp (twice the average) is more frequent and also to a childcare centre on the workplace (3 times more than the average). Holidays vouchers are also more widespread than elsewhere: 82% of establishments propose them.

The preservation of completed wage during maternity and paternity leave is the rule (98%), but also the possible prolongation of this leave. Establishments provide health services or finance for all employees a health insurance. Availability is not a requirement for promotion. Part time is allowed on request in two thirds of the firms of this class, and also the possibility to work at home for personal reasons.

Most of these establishments belong to the public sector (70%) and are big size. The percentage of female is high around 5% higher than in average. Both administrative sector and education social and health sectors are overrepresented. These establishments seem to have huge organization constraints since 45% of them are open regularly during the night, 55% on Saturdays. Hospitals belong mainly to this class 2.

The **class 3** called "work schedule adjustments and consideration of family situation" regroups 11% of the firms. Less institutionalised, family-friendly measures are adapted according to each employee preferences. The family situation of employees is taken into account in the organisation of work: for the work schedules (7 times more), for the moves and assignments and for internal mobility (6 times more), for part time attribution (three times more), for the day-off organisation (2.5 times more). The family-friendly practices focus on schedule arrangements. These firms allow twice more time-schedule adjustments to adapt to school or kinder garden schedules, more than twice more for long commuting. In case of child illness, time schedule arrangements are very common (90%). Part time is accepted on simple request. Work at home for private convenience, is more allowed than in the average.

In compensation, very few financial and in kind benefits are provided, even the most widespread, such as birth premium, or marriage premium (lowest frequency in this class). Availability is a stronger determinant for promotion than elsewhere. Schedule adjustments are then possible but may be penalizing for career.

Non profitable organizations and state public sector are overrepresented. They are small size establishments: 65% have less than 200 employees. There is a high proportion of executives.

Lastly, in the **class 4**, the familial constraints of employees are completely ignored (named 'family ignored'. Taking into account the family life for the organisation of work is not an issue. Part time is often "never accepted" (twice more than in average). The possibility to

choose the day of RTT (day-offs obtained after the 35 hours reform in France) is more likely impossible than elsewhere. Even the most widespread family measures such as birth premium are twice less provided. By opposition to class 3, availability is not a criterion for promotion. There are very few family friendly measures even the more widespread such as the time schedule the first day of school.

In this class, borders between work and family are very clear. Family life does not determine work organisation but employers do not expect further availability of employees.

Staff is more masculine than on average, the firm size is small.

Table 2. Distribution of men and women by class

	Distribution of women	Distribution of men
No benefit, priority to efficiency	46.0	52.9
Modern paternalism	35.2	27.9
Work schedule adjustments	11.0	11.0
Family ignored	7.8	8.2

Compared to men, women work more frequently in companies belonging to the class that offers the largest range of benefits related to family (table 2). This is relevant with the idea that women choose jobs that help them to better combine work and family. However, women are equally represented as men in the third class which allow work schedule adjustments, i.e. facilities that are a key determinant of work-life balance.

In the next step, we will analyse whether there is a wage penalty in sectors that help to combine family and work.

6 Firms' family friendly policies and wage inequalities

6.1 Gender wage inequalities in France

Among the French wage earners of establishments of 20 employees and more, there are substantial differences by gender in the median weekly working hours: women earn 91% of men's wage (table 3)[2]. The female/male hourly pay ratio varies also a great deal by family status. Childless women do rather well, with a median hourly wage of 101.5% of that of childless men; mothers' relative pay is always much lower than that of fathers and falls with the number of children, from 92% with one child to 82% with 3 children and more. This gender gap is in part explained by part-time work, which is female-dominated and which increases with the number of children.

[2] The French wage gap is higher when a full sample of wage earners is considered (not only those working in establishments with 20 employees and more)

Table 3: Median hourly wage by gender and number of children

	Women						Men					
		Number of children				Total with children		Number of children				Total with children
	Total	0	1	2	3+		Total	0	1	2	3+	
Hourly wage	8.30	8.04	8.50	8.74	8.07	8.58	9.12	7.92	9.24	9.82	9.90	9.63
Women's hourly wage / Men's hourly wage	91.0%	101.5%	92.0%	89.0%	81.5%	89.1%						
N	1332	337	289	502	204	995	1347	415	259	437	236	932

Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005.

The median hourly wage also varies according to the different groups of firms (table 4). It is higher in the second group, which is also the class that offers the largest range of benefits, and the over-representation of female workers. According to this descriptive statistics, it seems that employees of those firms do not weigh the wage penalty in compensation of family friendly benefits.

The median hourly wage is lower in the first class. The male/female wage gap is also larger in this group. There are no gender wage differences in average in the group of firms that ignore family in work organisation, such as there would be no inequalities when there is a strong dissociation between private and public sphere.

Table 4: Median hourly wage by class and gender

	Total	Women	Men	Women's hourly wage / Men's hourly wage
No benefit, priority to efficiency	8.09	7.59	8.58	88.5%
Modern paternalism	9.72	9.24	10.3	89.7%
Work schedule adjustments	8.58	8.09	8.69	93.1%
Family ignored	8.58	8.58	8.58	100.0%

Source: EFE, INED, 2004-2005.

6.2 Regression

In this section, we address the question of the existence and extent of a direct impact of family friendly practices on wages. We conduct this empirical investigation by steps: first, we start with a wage equation, which includes human capital variables (education, experience and tenure), the number of children and marital status (in partnership or not), control variables (region of residence and immigrant status) and several regressors to control for relevant characteristics of the current job: we take into account the time status (full-time work/part time work), a set of dummy for the ownership status of the establishment[3] (Private company/ French or international group /Non profit organisation/ Public sector/ Public firm), the occupational status (4 dummies from the highest level to the lowest), and whether the person

[3] The information for the firm's size and ownership status is given in the « establishment questionnaire » and thus, of high quality.

is in a position of responsibility. We also include controls for the enterprise size (6 dummies) and sector of activity (6 dummies). In a second step we add dummy variables related to the classes of firms in terms of family friendly practices.

The dependent variable is always the logarithm of the hourly wage (Lwh, computed on the basis of the monthly wage and number of hours usually worked per week). The equations are estimated for women and men separately using ordinary least squared regression.

Having had children may play on the selection into employment, and can cause adjustments in the participation to the labour force. As women bear the main share of family responsibilities, the effects of children are expected to be quite different for women and for men. In order to correct for this possible selection in employment, we correct for such bias using the Heckman's two-steps procedure (Heckman, 1979). The inverse Mill's ratio is obtained from a probit equation. The selection equation (estimated only for women[4]) includes: six age dummies, education dummies, the number of children and a dummy if the person has at least 1 child aged under 6, a dummy for living in couple, for home ownership, dummies to control for being an immigrant, having had health problem, and indicators for the individuals' parents activity status (always at work vs. other situations) – which we use with home ownership as the exclusion variables[5].

6.3. First results

Traditional variables included in the regression have expected relation with wage: wage increase with the level of education, with experience, tenure and hierarchical level. Family characteristics (living in couple or the number of children) have no effect on female wage in France, since they play mainly on participation decision. On the other hand, living in couple and having children is positive for men's wage, since their wife often wear the largest burden of the household and parental tasks.

Compared to industry, wages are also lower in the real estate, trade and services to individuals. There are no significant differences between other sectors. Our data set allow us to distinguish several types of ownership status of the firm. It appears that wages are higher in public firms, *ceteri paribus*. They are also higher in large companies (over 1000 employees).

The multivariate analysis confirms descriptive statistics. Compared to paternalist companies, wages are lower in firms with no benefits. This result is not consistent with the theory of compensating wage differentials. One can conclude that family friendly benefits are not supported by employees, but by companies in 'paternalist companies'. A large share of those companies are public. Thus, the State supports the cost of family friendly practices.

On the other hand, there is a wage penalty of working in companies that allow work schedule adjustments, which is consistent with the compensating wage differentials. It thus seems that employers do not pay for costs related to work organisation (schedule flexibility); workers have to pay for such amenities. Such types of family friendly policies are probably more costly for companies than offering some in cash benefits. Moreover, time schedule flexibility is highly demanded by employees ; they are more ready to pay for such flexibility.

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[4] Almost 100 % of men are in the labor force. For the same reason, other studies on the gender wage gap in Europe do not correct for men selection into employment, *cf.* Beblo et al. (2003).

[5] The estimations show the expected effects of children and living in couple (negative and significant). The exclusion variable related to the individual's mother's employment history is significant and has the expected sign: women whose mothers always worked are less likely to be economically inactive. The detailed results are presented in Appendix 2. The sample means are reported in Appendix 1.

Table 4: OLS equation

	Women		Men	
	-1	-2	-1	-2
More than 2 yrs higher	0.280***	0.277***	0.309***	0.307***
education	(7.80)	(7.71)	(10.41)	(10.36)
Up to 2 yrs higher	0.193***	0.190***	0.186***	0.183***
education	(5.56)	(5.48)	(6.62)	(6.50)
Secondary education	0.132***	0.126***	0.123***	0.121***
	(4.48)	(4.28)	(5.11)	(5.02)
Vocational diploma	0.073***	0.068***	0.057***	0.057***
	(2.89)	(2.69)	(3.04)	(3.04)
No education	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Experience	0.008**	0.008**	0.006**	0.007**
	(2.09)	(2.07)	(1.97)	(2.12)
Experience	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
squared	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.14)	(0.31)
Tenure	0.022***	0.022***	0.018***	0.018***
	(7.07)	(7.13)	(6.34)	(6.15)
Tenuse squared	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000*
	(2.52)	(2.65)	(2.03)	(1.88)
Serious illness	-0.038*	-0.038*	-0.048**	-0.049**
	(1.85)	(1.86)	(2.45)	(2.52)
Couple	0.012	0.012	0.048***	0.048***
	(0.64)	(0.63)	(2.79)	(2.75)
Number of children	-0.003	-0.002	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.31)	(0.17)	(2.16)	(2.07)
Immigrant	0.029	0.033	-0.043	-0.042
	(0.74)	(0.85)	(1.40)	(1.35)
Full time	-0.041**	-0.040**	-0.113***	-0.117***
	(2.32)	(2.28)	(2.88)	(2.99)
Management and	0.390***	0.386***	0.283***	0.281***
professionals	(10.27)	(10.12)	(10.60)	(10.54)
Middle management	0.210***	0.206***	0.100***	0.099***
and technicians	(6.63)	(6.47)	(5.13)	(5.09)
Clerks	0.063**	0.057**	-0.015	-0.017
	(2.26)	(2.05)	(0.65)	(0.78)
Workers	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Position of responsability	0.025	0.022	0.052***	0.053***
	(1.27)	(1.15)	(3.46)	(3.50)
Paris and suburb	0.095***	0.092***	0.092***	0.090***
	(4.95)	(4.82)	(4.84)	(4.68)
Industry and construction	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Energy, transportation, finance	-0.006	-0.013	0.002	-0.000
and services to companies	(0.22)	(0.51)	(0.12)	(0.02)
Real estate, trade and	-0.102***	-0.098***	-0.116***	-0.114***
services to individuals	(3.66)	(3.53)	(5.25)	(5.15)
Education and health	0.031	0.032	-0.082**	-0.080**
	(0.89)	(0.92)	(2.26)	(2.20)
Administration	-0.032	-0.036	-0.035	-0.033
	(0.84)	(0.93)	(0.94)	(0.90)
Private company	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
French or international group	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.41)	(1.38)

Non profit organisation	-0.050	-0.063*	-0.056	-0.062
	(1.45)	(1.81)	(1.34)	(1.48)
Public sector	0.024	-0.019	0.058*	0.024
	(0.72)	(0.52)	(1.67)	(0.66)
Public firm	0.122***	0.087*	0.072**	0.040
	(2.78)	(1.90)	(2.23)	(1.16)
Firm size: 20-49	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Firm size:50-199	0.020	0.019	0.032*	0.033*
	(0.99)	(0.95)	(1.65)	(1.70)
Firm size: 200-499	0.022	0.015	0.037*	0.036*
	(0.95)	(0.64)	(1.73)	(1.68)
Firm size: 500-999	0.027	0.017	0.038	0.032
	(0.96)	(0.61)	(1.51)	(1.26)
Firm size : 1000 & +	0.079***	0.060**	0.079***	0.066***
	(3.17)	(2.29)	(3.38)	(2.79)
No benefit, priority to efficiency		-0.071***		-0.059***
		(3.06)		(2.92)
Modern paternalism	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Work schedule adjustments		-0.050*		-0.057**
		(1.82)		(2.28)
Family ignored		-0.031		-0.039
		(0.99)		(1.41)
lambda	0.017	0.009		
	(0.38)	(0.21)		
Constant	3.108***	3.184***	3.328***	3.391***
	(62.72)	(56.69)	(69.29)	(64.77)
Observations	1332	1332	1347	1347
R-squared	0.47	0.48	0.53	0.53
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses				
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%				

6.3. Firms' family policies and the gender wage gap
<to be done>

7. Conclusion

<to be done>

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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Women		Men	
	Mean	Std	Mean	Std
Hourly wage (ln)	3,629	0,349	3,719	0,339
More than 2 yrs higher education	0,253	0,435	0,184	0,388
Up to 2 yrs higher education	0,160	0,367	0,121	0,326
Secondary education	0,179	0,384	0,162	0,368
Vocational diploma	0,245	0,430	0,347	0,476
No education	0,163	0,369	0,186	0,389
Paris and suburb	0,185	0,389	0,157	0,364
Immigrant	0,044	0,204	0,048	0,214
Experience	5,092	5,557	6,276	6,468
Tenure	9,799	8,424	10,111	8,252
serious illness	0,141	0,348	0,127	0,333
Number of children	1,472	1,125	1,419	1,210
Couple	0.767	0.423	0.783	0.412
Full time	0,752	0,432	0,972	0,166
Management and professionals	0,136	0,343	0,195	0,396
Middle management and technicians	0,280	0,449	0,277	0,448
Clerks	0,471	0,499	0,140	0,347
Workers	0,113	0,317	0,389	0,488
Position of responsability	0,188	0,391	0,324	0,468
Industry and construction	0,183	0,387	0,399	0,490
Energy, transportation, finance and services to companies	0,180	0,384	0,218	0,413
Real estate, trade and services to individuals	0,139	0,346	0,128	0,334
Education and health	0,344	0,475	0,114	0,317
Administration	0,154	0,361	0,142	0,349
Private company	0,190	0,392	0,258	0,437
French or international group	0,278	0,448	0,405	0,491
non profit organisation	0,144	0,351	0,045	0,206
Public sector	0,355	0,479	0,233	0,423
Public firm	0,033	0,179	0,059	0,236
Firm size: 20-49	0,203	0,403	0,189	0,392
Firm size:50-199	0,327	0,469	0,318	0,466
Firm size: 200-499	0,193	0,395	0,209	0,406
Firm size: 500-999	0,098	0,298	0,111	0,314
Firm size : 1000 & +	0,178	0,383	0,174	0,379
clas1	0,460	0,499	0,529	0,499
clas2	0,352	0,478	0,279	0,449
clas3	0,110	0,313	0,110	0,313
clas4	0,078	0,268	0,082	0,275
	1332		1347	

Appendix 2. Probit equation

Dependant variable: 1: Wage earners ; 0: Inactive

	Women
25 – 30 years	0.285*
	(1.65)
30 – 35 years	0.635***
	(3.82)
35 – 40 years	0.502***
	(3.00)
40 – 45 years	0.532***
	(3.10)
45 years & +	0.483***
	(2.69)
Immigrant	-0.638***
	(5.36)
Couple	-0.401***
	(3.95)
Number of children	-0.355***
	(10.41)
Youngest child < 6	-0.798***
	(9.46)
Serious illness	-0.042
	(0.45)
More than 2 yrs higher education	0.991***
	(9.27)
Up to 2 yrs higher education	0.983***
	(7.93)
Secondary education	0.596***
	(5.70)
Vocational diploma	0.436***
	(4.84)
Mother always at work	0.151**
	(2.18)
Father always at work	-0.030
	(0.30)
Home ownership	0.112
	(1.53)
Constant	0.758***
	(4.13)
Number of observations	2025
pseudo r2	25,3

Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%