Neighborhood Violent Crime during a New Era of Immigration
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The 1990s was a period of simultaneous concentration and dispersal for the immigrant population in the United States (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). While vibrant migrant streams remained in large cities with traditionally high levels of immigration, economic and social changes also influenced a shift in settlement patterns towards places with relative low immigrant populations at the start of the decade. Although past neighborhood studies find little or no evidence of any association between immigration and neighborhood crime, few consider how varying characteristics of cities and neighborhoods may have an influence. This project uses the Neighborhood Change Database and the National Neighborhood Crime Study to examine how the effects of immigration on neighborhood violent crime vary in neighborhoods and cities that vary according to their immigration histories. Using multilevel modeling techniques, I argue that local immigrant concentration and growth contribute to a decline in neighborhood violence, but that this is condition by factors associated with city-level immigration. Further, the effects of city-level immigration dynamics are stronger in more integrated neighborhoods.

Introduction

Research on immigration and crime has its roots in the early Chicago School (Martìnez 2006). Using immigration as a proxy for population heterogeneity, scholars examined rates of neighborhood crime and delinquency in communities of European immigrants around the Chicago area (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Shaw and McKay 1969). Results from this work suggested economic and social factors compelled new immigrants to settle in low-income, high-crime neighborhoods (Bursik 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). Over time, immigrants were able to move to "safer" parts of the city as they integrated into the local economy but crime remained a feature of the neighborhood (Bursik 2006). Thus, crime was a structural feature of the neighborhood, not the particular residents (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). Contemporary analysis of immigration and neighborhood crime, particularly surrounding Latino immigrants, has yielded similar results (Martìnez 2006; Sampson 2008). Despite higher than average rates of disadvantage and population turnover, immigrant neighborhoods have relatively low levels of violence. To some, these findings are evidence of "immigrant revitalization," that immigration decreases crime in disadvantaged local areas (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). The consistency of these findings notwithstanding, much of our knowledge about immigration and neighborhood violence comes from findings in established destination cities, based on large and deep-rooted immigrant neighborhoods.

While migration from abroad continued to fill immigrant neighborhoods in places like Los Angeles, Chicago, and Miami, internal migration of the foreign-born and the emergence of new migrant networks led to the rapid rise of immigrant communities in "new destination" cities like Charlotte, NC and Minneapolis, MN (Iceland 2009; Singer 2004; 2009). This continually growing assortment of destination cities and increasing residential assimilation during the 1990s led to greater integration and diversity across the country (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011; Timberland and Iceland 2007; Iceland 2009). Thus, the influence of immigration reached far outside of traditionally Latino areas, where most

immigrants live, and into all communities in the United States. Immigrant growth had become a feature of American cities and neighborhoods.

The emergence of new and growing immigrant destinations presents a new challenge for scholars of immigration and crime. First, immigration is influenced a much wider variety of communities than ever before. While there is evidence that immigrant concentration reduces neighborhood violence, immigrant settlement patterns nationwide indicate that different communities have different immigrant growth experiences (Iceland 2009; Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). It follows that the influence of immigration on rates of violence is likely to vary in racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Peterson and Krivo 2010). Second, little attention has been paid to how city-level immigrant context influences local neighborhood violence. Sampson (2006) calls neighborhoods in established destination cities some of the "safest" places in the United States. However, many established destinations have established ethnic communities that serve as a source of social capital for immigrants (Leach and Bean 2008; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). In new destination cities, immigrant growth is more isolated, increasing as the pace of city-level growth increases (Park and Iceland 2010; Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Thus, the effects of immigration on crime in different neighborhood may vary in different cities along with other structural predictors.

In this project, I seek to extend the literature on immigration and crime by addressing how changing neighborhood and city-level features influence rates of local violence. In doing so, I intend to test Sampson's (2008, pg. 33) hypothesis "that immigration and the increasing cultural diversity that accompanies it" is associated with a decline in violence. I use UCR and US Census data to examine how local immigrant concentration and growth influence violent crime rates between 1999-2001. Further, I use a multilevel modeling strategy to examine how rates of violence vary for neighborhoods of distinct racial/ethnic composition across a series of cities classified according to their immigration histories. Last, I test whether this destination classification moderates the effects of local immigrant settlement patterns on rates of violence.

Background and theory

Neighborhood immigration

Due to their positions at the socioeconomic poles in the United States, black and white neighborhoods were relatively unaffected by immigration for a long period (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2008; Peterson and Krivo 2010a). For the most part, the settlement patterns of immigrants closely adhered to a stratified system of neighborhoods. Specifically, immigrants are prone to settling in large co-ethnic communities characterized by a shared ethnic and cultural heritage, typically large cities with diverse populations and economies (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Sassen 1998). However, a series of economic and political changes during the end of the 20th century led to a shift in immigrant settlement patterns. At the end of the century, immigration was influencing a greater number of American cities and neighborhoods than ever before (Iceland 2009; Singer 2004).

The 1990s were a period of extensive growth and dispersion of immigrants throughout the United States. The result has been greater urban diversity and declining levels of segregation in many areas (Iceland 2009). Thus far, research on the effects of changing immigrant residential patterns on local communities has focused a great deal on the spatial assimilation of immigrants to natives (Iceland 2009; Iceland and Scopilliti 2008; Park and Iceland 2010). The consensus was that the concentration of the foreign-born increased during the 1990s (Iceland 2009). However, the pace of segregation was associated with city-level factors. Established destinations were far more segregated than new destinations, while segregation in new destinations increased with the relative size of the foreign-born population (Iceland 2009; Park and Iceland 2010). Notably, there were a steady and growing number of "integrated" communities, as immigration has changed the face of many urban communities, particular lower-middle class white neighborhoods (Iceland 2009). Clearly, the effects of immigrant settlement patterns on local structure vary from place to place in racially stratified neighborhood structure. Drawing on the urban disadvantage, social disorganization, and immigrant revitalization perspectives, I develop arguments that suggest that variations in immigrant settlement patterns have implications for our understanding of the immigration and crime relationship.

Urban disadvantage

Most whites live in neighborhoods where they constitute a racial supermajority (Squires and Kubrin 2006; Peterson and Krivo 2010). By taking advantage of higher housing prices in urban and suburban neighborhoods, they are able to maintain a level of privilege and isolation (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Peterson and Krivo 2010). In contrast, African-Americans tend to be highly segregated from other groups in predominantly urban areas plagued by social problems, particularly high levels of poverty and joblessness (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Wilson 1987). Latino and integrated neighborhoods fall in between on the socioeconomic scale, but rarely achieve the level of economic privilege that majority white neighborhoods realize (Peterson and Krivo 2010). Given their ethnic minority status and low levels of human capital, Latino and integrated communities have larger concentrations of the foreign-born (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011; Iceland 2009). This has translated into an assumption that immigrant may contribute to higher rates of violence (Martìnez 2006).

The association between economic disadvantage and violent crime is well established. Early studies in Chicago found that neighborhoods poverty rates were highly associated with the presence of delinquency (Shaw and McKay 1969). Peterson and Krivo (2010) demonstrate that high disadvantage leads to crime in a diverse sample of neighborhoods across a host of U.S. cities. Disadvantage neighborhoods are far less likely to receive substantial economic and political investment (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Further, by hindering a community's ability to foster social control, local disadvantage cultivates a culture where crime is an accepted part of daily life (Anderson 1999). If immigrants are more likely to arrive in low-income, non-white neighborhoods, it follows that these neighborhoods should have higher rates of violence than neighborhoods with low immigrant concentration. This assertion is central to social disorganization theory (Shaw and McKay 1969).

Social disorganization

Social disorganization theory argues that certain community structural features, economic disadvantage, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity, interfere with a community's ability to realize shared goals and enact meaningful social control (Bursik 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969).

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Immigration in low-income neighborhoods affects both residential instability and population heterogeneity (Bursik 2006; Shaw and McKay 1969). Therefore, a "socially disorganized" community should have higher rates of violence and delinquency.

Neighborhoods with high immigrant concentration may be relatively disadvantaged, but they often exhibit high levels of ethnic homogeneity (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005). While this affects segregation, community homogeneity may facilitate the formation of social bonds, thereby increasing the likelihood of informal control within immigrant communities (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Shaw and McKay 1969). Further, these neighborhoods are located in established "immigrant friendly" economies in cities with large immigrant populations (Sassen 1998). These community and labor market ties promote social integration and protect against the deleterious effects of disadvantage (Martìnez 2002). Therefore, communities with relatively large immigrant populations are in a better position to generate the social and political coordination essential to fostering positive social control and protection against violent crime (Martìnez 2006; Sampson 2008).

Immigrant revitalization perspective

In light of recent findings, scholars of immigration and crime have called for a reevaluation of social disorganization theory. They point to an "immigrant revitalization" perspective that argues that ethnic heterogeneity, specifically immigrant concentration, is actually associated with a decrease in violence (Lee and Martinez 2009; Martinez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). Immigrant revitalization draws from the "immigrant paradox" literature that finds poor immigrant performing better than expected along a number of outcomes (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008).

Controlling for disadvantage, immigrant concentration is associated with lower rates of violent crime (Feldmeyer 2009; Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Sampson 2008). Martìnez and colleagues (2010) examined San Diego neighborhoods between 1980 and 2000 and found a negative relationship between immigrant concentration and homicide, even after controlling for prior homicide. Further, immigrant concentration affects individual outcome criminological outcomes as well. Using a nationally

representative data set of adolescents, Desmond and Kubrin (2009) found that immigrant concentration was negatively associated with delinquent behavior.

A new era in context

Central to urban disadvantage, social disorganization, and immigrant revitalization theories is the notion that certain structural antecedents to crime are not associated with the racial and ethnic structures of the neighborhood, but are a feature of the neighborhood itself. Disadvantage, residential instability, and population heterogeneity positively influence local violence in all neighborhoods (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Shaw and McKay 1969). Sampson (2008) argues that immigrant revitalization influences crime in all neighborhoods. However, work that is more recent suggests that neighborhoods of different ethnic and racial composition vary so much with respect to structural conditions, that these conditions vary in terms of their influence on local violence.

The influence of concentrated disadvantage on violence is much stronger in white neighborhoods than in non-white neighborhoods, particularly due to such low levels in white neighborhoods overall (Peterson and Krivo 2000; 2010a). Vèlez (2001) demonstrated how community ties to city-level government are much more important for preventing victimization in high-disadvantage neighborhoods than for low-disadvantage neighborhoods. Residential instability was not associated with increases in homicide rates in San Diego neighborhoods and percent foreign-born in the neighborhood was negatively associated with white and Latino homicide rates, but not African-American (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). Thus, immigration, along with other structural features, varies with respect to its affect on violence in local areas.

Structures external to the neighborhood influence local violence differently across different racially and ethnically composed neighborhoods. Community ties to the city government and policing increase their ability to foster social control, particularly in highly disadvantaged neighborhoods (Vèlez 2001). In established destinations, there exists a network of social ties, both formal and informal, that form a social safety net for new immigrant communities (Shihadeh and Winters 2010). Given to propensity of immigrants to settle in Latino or integrated neighborhoods, it is unlikely these networks

significantly influence white or black neighborhoods on their own. However, it may affect crime in one of two ways.

The first potential way city-level immigration context could influence local rates of violence is by preventing the formation community ties. To date, it is unclear to what extent the same social networks present in established destinations exist in new destinations. Light and von Scheven (2008) discuss how migrants find work, settle in a neighborhood, and develop strong migrant networks form to attract newcomers from abroad. However, the extent to which these ties are with a community or developed as community ties with the local government is unclear for different neighborhoods. Thus, disorganized communities in new destinations may not be able to generate the formal social control necessary to prevent violence (Hipp, Tita, and Boggess 2009; Vèlez 2001).

However, the growth of new destination cities has been associated with economic improvement (Singer 2009). Increases in the immigrant population are associated with a growing service sector economy, as new employers seek out cheap foreign labor to meet the growing demands of the professional class (Liaw and Frey 2007; Sassen 1998; Wright and Dwyer 2003). Martìnez (2006) and other immigrant revitalization theorists argue that these labor market ties are a sign of "selection bias" on the part of immigrants, who are in the country to work and not commit crime (Sampson 2008). Thus, city-level immigrant context may moderate the local effects of immigration.

This project draws on migration and criminological theory to test a series of hypotheses surrounding immigrant settlement patterns and neighborhood rates of violence. Prior research suggests that neighborhoods in the United States are stratified along racial and ethnic lines (Peterson and Krivo 2010a). Moreover, this stratification results in these neighborhoods having very different experiences with respect to immigrant and crime. Thus, by stratifying my sample according to racial and ethnic composition, I am able to test assumptions of immigration and crime in different social worlds.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis #1: Neighborhood immigrant concentration and immigrant growth will be negatively associated with neighborhood violent crime rates.

My first hypothesis draws directly from Sampson's (2008) assertion that increased immigration with decrease crime for all neighborhoods. Indeed, this relationship has been observed consistently in past research, especially in established destinations (Feldmeyer 2009; Martìnez 2006; Martìnez, Lee, and Nielsen 2004; Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). However, recent neighborhood research nationwide suggests that immigration is related to reductions in expected violent crime rates (Peterson and Krivo 2010; Sampson 2008). Thus, I expect to observe a negative relationship between immigrant concentration, immigrant growth, and local rates of violence.

Hypothesis #2: City-level immigration context will influence neighborhood violence in integrated neighborhoods, but not white, black, or Latino neighborhoods

Prior studies suggest that ethnic homogeneity influences local rates of violence, particularly for white and Latino neighborhoods (Peterson and Krivo 2010a; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010). Thus, while Latino and white neighborhoods are fundamentally different with respects to local immigration, it is easier for these places to come together to meet common goals (Shaw and McKay 1969). Integrated neighborhoods, on the other hand, are ethnically heterogeneous. While established destinations may have city government programs in place that integrated neighborhoods can take advantage of, low-growth and high-growth cities are likely lacking in such efforts (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010; Waters and Jimènez 2005). Thus, unable to draw on community ties at the city level, integrated neighborhoods outside of established destinations would have higher rates of violent crime.

Hypothesis #3: City-level immigration context will moderate the effects of local immigrant concentration and immigrant growth on rates of violent crime. These moderation effects will vary across neighborhood type.

While I predict a negative overall immigration and crime relationship, I argue that city-level context moderates these effects in different neighborhoods. For white neighborhoods, immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are much higher in established destinations (Iceland 2009). Further, white neighborhoods have lower rates of violence in general (Peterson and Krivo 2010a). Thus, I argue that the negative immigration and crime relationship in white neighborhoods is a feature primarily of

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established destination cities, where immigrant concentration and growth may be large enough to influence the already low crime rates. While I argue that immigration effects in Latino neighborhoods are primarily observed at the neighborhood-level, I suggest that in high-growth destinations, immigrant growth in Latino neighborhoods significantly reduces crime. First, Latino neighborhoods are racial homogenous. Thus, Latino immigration will not influence the racial heterogeneity of the neighborhood. Second, and more importantly, Latino neighborhoods in new destinations are likely to have early social and employment networks that attract migrants (Light and von Scheven 2008). Thus, immigrant growth will not have a disruptive effect on racially homogeneous Latino neighborhoods. In integrated neighborhoods, on the other hand, there is a great deal of ethnic heterogeneity. Thus, immigrant growth does have a potentially disruptive effect. If community residents cannot come together to develop collective goals and establish community ties to manage this disruptive effect, immigrant growth could actually increase rates of violence.

Data and methods

Sample

Data come from the National Neighborhood Crime Study (NNCS), with 1990 tract and city measures from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB). The NNCS, conducted by Ruth Peterson and Lauren Krivo (2006), compiles Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data for violent and property crime at the census tract-level for a representative sample of cities with populations over 100,000 in 1999. Previous studies involving neighborhood crime relied on police reports for small numbers of cities, which did not allow for generalizability of findings (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009). The NNCS provides a unique data set of cities randomly selected within census region and includes crime data for 9563 census tracts within 91 cities. The cross-sectional nature of the NNCS prevents me from measuring change in Latino population in cities from 1990 to 2000. The NCDB, conducted by the Urban Institute and GeoLytics, Inc., allows me to overcome this issue. I use 1990 and 2000 census tract-level population from the NCDB, which allowed me to get an accurate measure of change in both neighborhood and city-level Latino concentration.

My analysis is restricted to 7,231 white, black, Latino, and integrated tracts in 72 cities in the

NNCS with significant immigrant populations. Neighborhoods are defined as majority white (n=3540),

black (n=1251), or Latino (n=1332) if the respective growth constitutes at least a 50 percent share of the

local population. Tracts with no compositional majority are referred to as integrated neighborhoods

(n=1108).

Before discussing the variables included in the study, it is important that I discuss the use of large

cities as research settings. This study seeks to analyze immigration effects on neighborhood violence in

large cities. Notably, immigrant growth (and immigration itself) is no longer strictly an urban

phenomenon. In fact, some of the fasting growing places in the United States are suburbs (Singer 2004),

the rural South (Kandel and Parrado 2005); and smaller cities throughout the nation (Park and Iceland

2010). However, the bulk of the social disorganization and urban disadvantage literature on immigrant

populations involves large urban areas. Further, while the proportion is less than in 1990, the bulk of

immigration continues to occur in neighborhoods of large cities (Frey 2003). Thus, in order to remain

consistent, I want to be certain to compare cities of similar sizes that differ with respect to their

immigration histories.

Dependent variables

Operationalizations for all dependent and independent variables for the analysis are in Appendix

A. The dependent variable is a for three-year (1999-2001) average count of tract-level homicides and

robberies, taken from official police reports and aggregated to the census tract. The strategy of using

multiyear counts is a common practice to minimize the impact of annual fluctuations in rare events at

small levels of aggregation (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009).

Independent variables

Tract-level variables: This project is most interested in studying the influence of immigration on

local violence; therefore, the central tract-level independent variables are *neighborhood immigrant*

concentration and *immigrant growth*. Because migratory trends involved movement within the United

States as well as from abroad, I want to use the most general measurement of immigrant concentration.

Therefore, I measure immigrant concentration as the percentage of the tract population born outside of the U.S. Doing so allows me to acquire a broad understanding of the immigration process across a wide range of U.S. neighborhoods. Use of this measure is common in past research (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010). I measured immigrant growth at the tract-level as the absolute difference in percent foreign-born of each tract in 2000 and in 1995, estimated using linear interpolation (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011).

Neighborhood disadvantage is an index composed of the average of summed z-scores for six variables that measure the: percent of the tract population employed in secondary sector, low-wage jobs; percent of the tract population employed in professional or management careers (reverse-coded); jobless rate for the working age population (16-64), percent female-headed households; percent of the tract population over 25 years with at least a high school diploma (reverse-coded); and percent of tract population living below the poverty line (= .92). This index has been used to measure disadvantage in prior research involving the NNCS (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Peterson and Krivo 2009).

Residential instability is measured by an index of the average of summed z-scores for the percentage of housing units that are renter occupied and the percentage of the tract population that lived in a different residence in 1995 (= .63). This index is a commonly used measure of residential instability in neighborhood analyses of crime (e.g., Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Peterson and Krivo 2010).

In addition to these central independent neighborhood measures, I include a measure of the percent of the tract that is male between 15 and 34 years old (*percent young males*) to control for the most crime prone population in the neighborhood.

City-level variables: The central city-level variable is *Immigrant destination* classification. Researchers have taken a number of different approaches when defining cities as "destination cities." These strategies are primarily determined by the unit of analysis being studied, particularly geography and population. Because the NNCS has complete information for large cities but not for full MSAs, I

have chosen to use the city as my geographic unit of analysis for classification. Further, because the focus is on immigration at large, I have chosen classify cities as "immigrant destinations."

Following closely with the strategy employed by Suro and Singer (2002), I classified cities into four categories according to their foreign-born populations and rate of immigrant growth. I classify cities with above average foreign-born concentration in 1990 and 2000 as *established destinations*. Next, cities with low immigrant populations (less than 5% in 2000) and lower than average population growth between 1990 and 2000 were classified as classified as *other cities*. Of the remaining cities with less than average foreign-born concentration, I divided them into cities with greater than average immigrant growth and cities with less than average immigrant growth during the decade. I consider those with greater than average Latino population growth *high-growth destinations* and those with less than average growth *low-growth destinations*.

In this sample, there are twenty-one established destinations, eighteen low-growth destinations, and thirty-one high-growth destinations. The substantive goal of this paper is to look at how immigrant settlement patterns affect violence in cities at the center of the major immigration over the 1990s. Since other cities tend to have such small immigrant populations in 2000, I made the decision to drop them from this analysis. After removing these cities, my analysis is restricted to 7231 tracts in 72 cities.

To capture *city-level disadvantage*, I construct an index of the average z-scores for six variables that measure the: percent of the tract population employed in secondary sector, jobless rate for the working age population (16-64); percent female-headed households in the city; percent of the city population employed in professional or management jobs (reverse-coded); percent of the city population over 25 with at least a high school diploma (reverse-coded); and percent of the city population living below the poverty line ($\alpha = .92$). In order to capture instability at the city-level, I include a measure of *percent movers*, the percentage of the city population that lived in a different residence in 1995. To capture labor market activity, I also include a measure of *manufacturing employment* defined as the percent of the employed civilian population age 16 and over employed in manufacturing industries.

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In line with prior research, I include two measures of segregation. These factors are operationalized using the Dissimilarity Index (*D*), a common measure for segregation. D measures the proportion of each group within a city that must move to a new neighborhood for there to be an even proportion in each neighborhood. Prior research argues that Black/white segregation significantly influences rates of violence in all neighborhoods, regardless of racial and ethnic composition (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009). Since the focus on this paper is immigrant settlement patterns, I chose a measure of foreign-born/native-born segregation to best capture immigrant proximity to the native majority. In the formula presented, fb_j and nb_j represent the number of foreign-born and Whites respectively residing in tract j while FB and NB are the total number of Latinos and Whites in the city.

$$D_{lw} = \left[.5 * \sum_{j=1}^{n} | \frac{fb_j}{FB} - \frac{nb_j}{NB} | \right] * 100$$

Segregation between blacks and whites has been shown to be positively associated with neighborhood violent crime in past research (Krivo, Peterson, and Kuhl 2009; Wadsworth 2010). While segregation between Latinos and whites is rarely included in models of crime rates, past research indicates that ethnic segregation varies with city-level immigration factors (Park and Iceland).

I include measures of the percent of the city that is non-Latino black (*city-level percent black*), foreign-born (*city-level immigrant concentration*), and the percentage of males between 15 and 34 years old (*city-level percent young males*). Percent black and percent Latino is included to establish any independent effects of racial heterogeneity at the city-level. Percentage of young males is intended to control for the most crime prone population in the city. Since larger cities larger cities tend to have higher rates of violent crime, I include a measure of *city-level population* (logged for linearity concerns). Finally, I include measures for census region to account for levels of both violence and population in the southern and western United States.

Analytic strategy

To study neighborhood violence as a function of both neighborhood and city level structures in cities with different immigration experiences, I estimate multilevel models using HLM 6.07 with tracts at level 1 and cities at level 2. Because I am analyzing rare events within small level 1 units, I estimate a nonlinear Poisson model with counts of violent crime as my dependent variable. Specifying these counts with variable exposure by tract population is the equivalent of analyzing violence rates (Osgood 2000). A common assumption of the Poisson model is equal means and variances of the dependent variable. Since the variance of my dependent variable is considerably larger than the mean, I control for overdispersion at level 1. Poisson models with overdispersion in HLM are analogous to a negative binomial model[1]. Continuous variables are grand-mean centered in the analysis, indicating that coefficients can be interpreted as the effects of changes from the overall mean in the sample. Furthermore, all city-level variables, such as city-level Latino growth, can be interpreted as the contextual effect on neighborhood-level violence, net of any neighborhood-level effects.

Findings

Before discussing the results of the multivariate models, it is important to discuss descriptive statistics presented in Table 1. These data draw attention to the extraordinary differences in violent crime and immigration across different neighborhoods. White neighborhoods, on average, have violent crime rates that are roughly half that of nearly all non-white neighborhoods. Further, mean levels of immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are far greater in Latino and integrated neighborhoods. Looking at the distribution across destination type, it is worth noting that most white neighborhoods are located in high-growth destination cities, while non-white neighborhoods are typically in established destination cities. Only a small number of Latino neighborhoods are in low-growth and high-growth destinations (6.5 percent and 23 percent, respectively).

[INSERT TABLE 1]

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[1] The simplest way of interpreting the coefficients for the negative binomial is by using the factor changes in expected counts. For instance, holding all other variables constant, for each unit increase in x, we would expect a percent change of $[(e^{bx} - 1) * 100]$ in the expected violent crime rate (Long 1997).

White neighborhoods

Table 2 presents findings for a succession of multilevel models for white neighborhoods. To save space, I chose not to present coefficients for city-level control variables[2]. Model 1 includes all relevant neighborhood and city-level predictors. At the neighborhood level, disadvantage and residential instability are both strongly and positively associated with local rates of violence. Notably, the coefficients for both immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are significant and negative. Specifically, a one-half standard deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant concentration (4.38) for white neighborhoods is associated with a 4.2 percent decline in neighborhood violent crime. The same increase in neighborhood immigrant growth (1.32) yields a 3.8 percent increase.

[INSERT TABLE 2]

Models 2 and 3 introduce cross-level interactions between destination type and immigrant concentration and immigrant growth respectively. Results from these models indicate that the negative relationship between immigration and crime is primarily a feature of established destination cities. Figure 1 displays predicted violent crime rates for increases in white neighborhood immigrant concentration and immigrant growth. Here we see that, in established destinations, increases in immigrant concentration are associated with significant declines in predicted violence. Immigration has a significant and negative effect in white neighborhoods most affected by immigration, those nested with larger immigrant communities. While the absolute decrease in violence remains small, a one-standard deviation increase in both immigrant concentration and immigrant growth in white, established destination neighborhoods yields declines in predicted violence of roughly 15-20 percent. Thus, immigration appears to protect against violence in white neighborhoods, specifically in cities with traditionally large immigrant concentration.

[INSERT FIGURE 1]

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[2] Notably, all coefficients were insignificant except for city-level percent black, which was positively associated with rates of violence in white neighborhoods. Results available upon request.

Black neighborhoods

Table 2 presents findings for a succession of multilevel models for black neighborhoods. To save space, I chose not to present coefficients for city-level control variables[3]. Overall, the findings for black neighborhoods suggest that immigration does not affect rates of violence. Notably, the coefficient for disadvantage (.266) is much lower than that for white neighborhoods (.814). The findings surrounding immigration mirror prior analysis and are likely a result of very low levels of immigration in black neighborhoods (Martìnez, Stowell, and Lee 2010; Peterson and Krivo 2010a; Saporu et. al. 2011).

One noteworthy exception is the significant coefficient for the cross-level interaction for neighborhood immigrant concentration in established destinations. While immigrant concentration is insignificant in low-growth destinations, it is significant in established destinations. Similar to white neighborhoods, black neighborhoods in established destinations are far more likely to have some foreign-born residents. Thus, the established destination black neighborhoods with relatively more immigrants have lower rates of violent crime than those with few immigrants.

The effects of immigrant concentration and immigrant growth on rates of local violence are consistently significant and negative. Furthermore, in both white and black neighborhoods, increases in immigrant concentration and growth are only significant in established destinations. However, immigrants are far more likely to live in co-ethnic or integrated neighborhoods (Iceland 2009).

Latino neighborhoods

Table 4 presents findings for a succession of multilevel models for Latino neighborhoods[4]. Model 1 includes all relevant neighborhood and city-level predictors. At the neighborhood level, disadvantage, residential instability, and percent young males are strongly and positively associated with local rates of violence. The coefficients for both immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are significant and negative. Specifically, a one-half standard deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant

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[3] In black neighborhoods, all city-level coefficients were insignificant. Results available upon request.
[4] In Latino neighborhoods, all coefficients were insignificant except for city-level percent black and population, which were positively associated with rates of violence in Latino neighborhoods. Results available upon request.

concentration (7.60) for white neighborhoods is associated with a 7.6 percent decline in neighborhood

violent crime. The same increase in neighborhood immigrant growth (2.61) yields a 3.5 percent decrease

in local violence. While local immigrant settlement features have a significant and negative effect on

rates of violence, factors associated with city-level immigration context do not appear to affect violent

crime in Latino neighborhoods.

Models 2 and 3 present cross-level interactions for neighborhood level immigration variables

and the destination dummies. As shown in Models, city-level immigrant history does not influence the

effects of neighborhood immigrant concentration on neighborhood violent crime rates. Thus, for all

Latino neighborhoods, increases in immigrant concentration are associated with similar declines in rates

of violence. This decline is displayed in Figure 2, which presents expected violent crime rates for

different levels of immigrant concentration for Latino neighborhoods in different immigrant destinations.

Turning to Model 3, the coefficient for immigrant growth is no longer significant. Thus, in established

destination cities (dummies for low-growth and high-growth destination are both equal to 0); increases in

levels of recent immigrant growth have no effect on local violence. There is no difference between

violent crime rates in high-growth and established destinations when immigrant growth is at its mean for

all Latino neighborhoods. However, as immigrant growth increases, violent crime rates in high-growth

and established destinations begin to converge. As Figure 2 demonstrates, for Latino neighborhoods in

high-growth destination cities, immigrant growth significantly and negatively associated with local

violent crime rates.

[INSERT FIGURE 2]

For Latino neighborhoods, ethnic homogeneity and a sizable immigrant concentration contribute

significantly to a decline in the prevalence of local violence. Furthermore, significant increases in

immigrant growth decrease rates of violence in these places. Certain features of Latino enclaves,

however, are hypothesized to contribute to lower rates of violence. The last set of models tests the

immigration and crime relationship in a fast-growing set of integrated neighborhoods, where no single race or ethnicity holds a majority.

Integrated neighborhoods

Table 5 presents findings for a succession of multilevel models for integrated neighborhoods[5]. Model 1 includes all relevant neighborhood and city-level predictors. At the neighborhood level, disadvantage, residential instability, and percent young males are strongly and positively associated with local rates of violence. As in white and Latino neighborhoods, the coefficients for both immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are both significant and negative. Specifically, a one-half standard deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant concentration (7.01) is associated with a 4.3 percent decline in neighborhood violent crime. A one-half standard deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant growth (2.2) yields a 3.4 percent decline in expected violence. Notably, along with local immigrant settlement features, city-level context appears to affect violent crime in integrated neighborhoods. Figure 3 displays expected violent crime rates for integrated neighborhoods in the three destination categories. Rates of violence for integrated neighborhoods are much higher outside of established destinations. Specifically, the "average" integrated neighborhood in low-growth and high-growth cities have 74.2 percent and 78.7 percent greater rates of violence than established destinations, respectively.

[INSERT TABLE 5]

Model 2 in Table 5 includes cross-level interactions for immigrant concentration and the destination dummies. Results from this model indicate that, holding neighborhood immigrant concentration is at its mean for integrated neighborhoods, rates of violence are significantly higher outside of established destinations. Moreover, increases in neighborhood immigrant concentration do not affect violence in low-growth or high-growth destination cities. This relationship is illustrated in Figure

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[5] In Integrated neighborhoods, all city-level coefficients were insignificant except for Black/White segregation, indicating that city-wide segregation of African-Americans affects rates of violence in integrated neighborhoods. Results available upon request.

4, which plots predicted violent crimes per 1000 at different levels of immigrant concentration in different immigrant destinations. In established destinations, a two standard-deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant concentration yields roughly a 19 percent decrease in local violence, while similar increases yield little change in low-growth and high-growth destination. It appears that the significant and positive effects of the destination dummies mediate the negative relationship between local immigration and violence.

[INSERT FIGURE 4]

Model 3 in Table 5 presents cross-level interactions for immigrant growth and the destination dummies. As with other models, rates of violence are higher outside of established destinations. However, the significant and positive coefficient for the cross-level interaction between immigrant growth and high-growth destinations suggests that the effects of slight increases in immigrant growth are markedly different in high-growth destination, integrated neighborhoods. Specifically, adding the coefficient for the interaction term to the coefficient for immigrant concentration changes the effect of immigrant concentration in high-growth destinations [-.007 + .039 = .032]. Therefore, a one-half standard deviation increase in neighborhood immigrant growth for established destinations (2.23) is associated with a 4.3 percent decline in neighborhood violent crime. The same increase in high-growth destinations is associated with a 2.2 percent increase in neighborhood violence. Figure 5 displays predicted violent crimes per 1000 at different levels of immigrant growth in different immigrant destinations. Notably, the effect of immigrant concentration on local violence differs little between low-growth and high-growth destinations. However, as immigrant concentration increases, the in violent crime between integrated cities in high-growth destination and those in established destinations widens significantly.

[INSERT FIGURE 5]

The results from Table 4 indicate that city-level immigration significantly affects rates of violence in integrated neighborhoods. Holding neighborhood level factors constant, established

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destinations, integrated neighborhoods have lower rates of violence than similar neighborhoods in low-growth and high-growth cities. Further, in high-growth cities, immigrant growth is associated with increases in crime, suggesting that this growth disrupts racially heterogeneous communities in cities with rapid immigrant growth. Figure 6 displays predicted violent crime rates for high-growth Latino and integrated neighborhoods at one standard deviation below and one standard deviation above mean immigrant growth. As displayed, an increase of two standard deviations around the mean for immigrant growth in Latino neighborhoods leads to a 5.4 percent decrease in expected violent crime rates. The same increase for integrated neighborhoods actually increases expected violent crime by roughly 9 percent. It appears those Latino neighborhoods are in a better position to absorb high levels of recent immigrant growth.

Conclusion

This article draws from assimilation, urban disadvantage, social disorganization, and immigrant revitalization to test a series of hypotheses regarding how aspects of the recent trend in immigration might influence neighborhood violence in divergent neighborhoods and cities. By employing two comprehensive data sets (the National Neighborhood Crime Study and the Neighborhood Change Database), I am able to use a multilevel modeling strategy to examine both neighborhood and city-level structural factors associated with neighborhood violent crime across a stratified sample of US neighborhoods.

I follow prior research in arguing that local immigration features are associated with a decline in violent crime for neighborhoods of all racial and ethnic type (Sampson 2008). Specifically, I argue that increases in immigrant concentration and immigrant growth are associated with declines in violent crime rates. While such effects are not observed in majority-black neighborhoods, I argue that descriptive statistics suggest that this is a feature of low levels on immigration in black neighborhoods overall. Second, I argue that local and city-level immigration features vary in their effects on crime in different neighborhoods. Generally, I argue that local effects are more important for racially homogeneous

neighborhoods and that the effect of these local immigration settlement patterns on violence is influenced by city-level immigration context in some cases. In particular, I suggest that increases in immigrant concentration and immigrant growth in white neighborhoods located in established destinations leads to decreases in violence not observed in low-growth or high-growth cities. This suggests that homogeneous white neighborhoods may rely on large minority immigrant populations within the city to buffer against the effects of increasing population heterogeneity. Further, new-destination Latino neighborhoods experience lower rates of violence as immigrant growth increases. Many of these neighborhoods are likely new "ethnic enclaves" with rich local networks that attracted newcomers with family and employment ties (Light and von Scheven 2008). Some scholarship suggests that many high-growth destinations have focused efforts at dealing with new immigrant communities that low-growth destinations may not have (Iceland 2009; Waters and Jimènez 2005).

Last, I argue that city-level immigrant context is more important for integrated neighborhoods, which lack a coherent ethnic identity and, by definition, have greater rates of heterogeneity. The inability to form local social bonds necessitates some communities to develop ties with the city government. Holding local immigrant concentration constant, I demonstrate that integrated neighborhoods in established destination cities have markedly lower rates of violent crime. Further, immigrant growth only decreases crime in established destination cities. In high-growth destinations, similar increases are associated with higher rates of violent crime.

The divergent patterns of immigrant growth and local violence for Latino and integrated neighborhoods in high-growth cities demonstrate the importance of local context and community ties. First, Latino neighborhoods appear able to cope with rapid population changes, while integrated neighborhoods cannot. Thus, absent a large immigrant community at the city level, Latino neighborhoods appear to rely on more local factors to prevent violence. Further, cities may focus any efforts at community policing towards Latino neighborhoods, where residents are better able to come together, particularly to request and acquire city-level assistance. Immigration in integrated neighborhoods, on the

other hand, disrupts such efforts and these communities are unable to develop the necessary social control.

I am inevitably restricted in my ability to generalize these findings in several ways. First, by using the most general indicator of immigration, I make no distinction regarding the ethnicity of immigrants. While such distinctions are extremely important for rates of violence (Cancino, Martìnez, and Stowell 2009; Nielsen, Lee, and Martìnez 2005), they are beyond the scope of this project. Second, due to census data, I am unable to disaggregate immigrant concentration and growth by legal status. Indeed, past research suggests that undocumented immigrants have similar migration patterns as legal migrants and are no more prone to violence (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009). Lastly, while this project has a strictly urban focus, immigrant growth has expanded far beyond the traditional urban metropolis (Kandel and Parrado 2005; Singer 2009). Nevertheless, the urban focus of this project allows me to compare neighborhoods in context, while building on and expanding a rich theoretical tradition in urban crime.

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Tables and figures

Table 1. Means and standard deviations for variables used in analysis

	White Neighborhoods (n=3540)		Black Neighborhoods (n=1251)		Latino Neighborhoods (n=1332)		Integrated Neighborhoods (n=1108)	
Tract-level								
Violent crime cate	2.53	4.98	9.82	7.72	5.14	5.63	4.84	5.89
Immigrant concentration	11.99	8.76	6.56	8.28	42.25	15.20	28.47	14.02
Immigrant growth	1.74	2.65	1.05	2.27	3.78	5.21	4.43	4.40
Neighborhood disadvantage	-0.71	0.47	0.80	0.71	0.76	0.51	0.09	0.57
Residential instability	-0.03	0.93	-0.09	0.79	0.25	0.75	0.40	0.83
Percent young males	16.22	6.76	13.05	3.23	18.28	3.78	17.74	5.16
City-level	(n=72)				(n=50)			
Established destination city	27.06%		45.88%		70.57%		55.51%	
Low-growth new destination	19.29%		19.42%		6.53%		12.73%	
High-growth new destination	53.64%		34.69%		22.90%		31.77%	
Disadvantage	-0.12	0.61	0.44	0.50	0.48	0.56	0.18	0.64
Percent manufacturing	11.34	3.72	10.85	4.23	11.99	2.81	11.67	3.76
Percent movers	54.26	4.68	50.29	4.02	52.22	4.14	53.42	4.44
Black/White segregation	54.94	16.92	71.13	11.40	62.64	17.22	58.39	16.43
Latino/White segregation	47.48	12.43	54.27	8.92	55.70	11.81	52.56	11.38
Percent black	16.96	12.97	35.38	13.88	16.04	11.41	18.13	11.89
Percent Latino	19.71	13.96	19.85	14.10	39.94	13.97	28.15	13.64
Percent young males	16.87	2.08	16.42	1.32	16.73	1.40	16.89	1.83
South	31.41%		44.12%		27.55%		28.97%	
West	38.19%		8.23%		56.38%		45.76%	
Population (in 1,000s)	926.57	1014.76	1127.73	1379.29	1947.19	1410.87	1216.20	1228.95

Table 2. Multilevel Poisson Models (with variables exposure) of Neighborhood violent crime in White neighborhoods (NNCS, 2000)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Neighborhood Level (n=4254)						
Immigrant concentration	-0.010 **	0.003	0.000	0.005	-0.011 **	0.003
Immigrant Growth	-0.029 ***	0.008	-0.037 ***	0.008	-0.005	0.019
Disadvantage	0.814 ***	0.041	0.822 ***	0.035	0.814 ***	0.035
Residential Instability	0.454 ***	0.033	0.455 ***	0.029	0.451 ***	0.029
Percent Young Males	-0.005	0.004	-0.007	0.004	-0.005	0.004
City Level (n=80)						
Established destinations[b]	-0.303	0.188	-0.184	0.221	-0.249	0.216
Low-Growth destinations[b]	-0.062	0.147	-0.062	0.122	-0.039	0.119
Immigrant concentration	0.018		0.013	0.009	0.016	0.009
Cross-level interactions						
Established X immigrant concentration			-0.015 *	0.006		
Low-growth X Immigrant concentration			0.004	0.010		
Established X immigrant growth					-0.048 *	0.021
Low-growth X Immigrant growth					0.001	0.021
Intercept	-6.56924 ***		-6.572 ***		-6.596 ***	

Note: A multilevel Poisson model with overdisopersion is analogous to a negative binomial modal

[b] reference is High-growth destination

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 3. Multilevel Poisson Models (with variables exposure) of Neighborhood violent crime in Black neighborhoods (NNCS, 2000)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Neighborhood Level (n=1732)						
Immigrant concentration	-0.003	0.003	0.008		-0.002	0.003
Immigrant Growth	0.008 ***	0.009	0.004		0.007	0.018
Disadvantage	0.266 ***	0.024	0.269 **		0.265 **	0.024
Residential Instability	0.212 ***	0.021	0.211 **		0.213 **	0.021
Percent Young Males	0.004	0.005	0.004		0.004	0.005
City Level (n=47)						
Established-Growth destinations [b]	-0.266	0.267	-0.242		-0.272	0.268
High-Growth destinations [b]	0.113	0.148	0.111		0.115	0.148
Immigrant concentration	0.010	0.010			0.010	0.010
Cross-level interactions						
Established-growth X Immigrant concentration			-0.016 **			
High-growth X immigrant concentration			-0.010			
Estabished-growth X Immigrant growth					0.004	0.021
High-growth X immigrant growth					-0.003	0.021
Intercept	-4.86856		-4.849 ***		-4.867 ***	

Note: A multilevel Poisson model with overdisopersion is analogous to a negative binomial modal

[b] reference is Low-growth destinations

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 4. Multilevel Poisson Models (with variables exposure) of Neighborhood violent crime in Latino neighborhoods (NNCS, 2000)

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	β		S.E.	β		S.E.	β		S.E.
Neighborhood Level (n=1332)									
Immigrant concentration	-0.010	***	0.002	-0.011	***	0.002	-0.010	***	0.002
Immigrant Growth	-0.014	**	0.005	-0.016	**	0.005	0.001		0.006
Disadvantage	0.477	***	0.047	0.472	***	0.047	0.478	***	0.046
Residential Instability	0.217	***	0.036	0.215	***	0.036	0.229	***	0.035
Percent Young Males	0.022	**	0.007	0.019	*	0.008	0.024	**	0.007
City Level (n=47)									
Low-Growth destinations[b]	0.328		0.181	0.324		0.223	0.362		0.180
High-Growth destinations[b]	0.188		0.176	0.226		0.177	0.314		0.177
Immigrant concentration	0.009		0.008	0.009		0.008	0.009		0.008
Cross-level interactions									
Low-growth X Immigrant concentration				0.000		0.005			
High-growth X immigrant concentration				0.005		0.008			
Low-growth X Immigrant growth							-0.046		0.010
High-growth X immigrant growth							-0.037	**	0.027
Intercept	-5.84232	***		-5.854	***		-5.825	***	

Note: A multilevel Poisson model with overdisopersion is analogous to a negative binomial modal

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 5. Multilevel Poisson Models (with variables exposure) of Neighborhood violent crime in Integrated neighborhoods (NNCS, 2000)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Neighborhood Level (n=1108)						
Immigrant concentration	-0.006 *	0.002	-0.008 **	0.003	-0.007 **	0.002
Immigrant Growth	-0.016 *	0.007	-0.019 **	0.007	-0.028 ***	0.008
Disadvantage	0.473 ***	0.048	0.472 ***	0.048	0.467 ***	0.048
Residential Instability	0.438 ***	0.041	0.439 ***	0.040	0.446 ***	0.040
Percent Young Males	-0.022 ***	0.006	-0.024 ***	0.007	-0.026 ***	0.006
City Level (n=62)						
Low-Growth destinations[b]	0.555 *	0.190	0.587 *	0.197	0.512 *	0.193
High-Growth destinations[b]	0.580 *	0.200	0.585 *	0.206	0.503 *	0.203
Cross-level interactions						
Low-growth X Immigrant concentration			0.008	0.007		
High-growth X immigrant concentration			0.006	0.005		
Low-growth X Immigrant growth					0.008	0.024
High-growth X immigrant growth					0.039 ***	0.014
Intercept	-6.00573 ***		-5.981 ***		-6.002 ***	

Note: A multilevel Poisson model with overdisopersion is analogous to a negative binomial modal

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Figure 1. Predicted violent crime rates at different levels of Immigrant concentration and immigrant growth for white neighborhoods in different immigrant destinations


Figure 2. Predicted violent crime rates at different levels of immigrant concentration and immigrant growth for Latino neighborhoods in different immigrant destinations

Figure 3. Predicted rates of violent crime for intergrated neighborhoods in Established, Low-growth, and High-growth destination cities


Figure 4. Predicted violent crime rates at different levels of immigrant concentration for integrated neighborhoods in different immigrant destinations

Figure 5. Predicted violent crime rates at different levels of immigrant growth for integrated neighborhoods in different immigrant destinations

Figure 6. Predicted violent crime rates for high-growth Latino and integrated neighborhoods at different levels of immigrant growth