

**REGIONAL DYNAMICS OF CHANGING RACIAL WAGE DISPARITY
BETWEEN WHITE AND BLACK MEN, 1983 TO 2009**

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates the dynamics of stagnating racial wage disparity, typically defined as the changes in the wage gap between white and black men from 1983 to 2009. By examining regional variation between the Southern U.S. and other regions using the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group, this study uncovers that uneven changes in racial inequality that vary by region, education, and age. Racial wage disparity continuously declined in the South since the 1980s, while it grows linearly in Other Regions. An aggravated cumulative disadvantage for black men during their working careers is generally observed in both regions, but whether it is due to a greater racial disadvantage for the older generation or improvement for the younger generation depends on region. The halt of progress in racial wage disparity since the early 1980s is not the result of the status quo in the national labor market. Instead, it is camouflaged by multiple dynamic forces working in opposite directions. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.

Keywords: Stagnating Racial Inequality, Racial Wage Inequality; Regional Variation; Cumulative Disadvantage

INTRODUCTION

During the past 30 years, the significance of race for African Americans has been hotly debated in academia. Although the topic is still controversial, it is generally agreed that racial inequality has been substantially reduced in the last half of the 20th Century, at least up to the early 1980s (Wilson 1978; Smith and Welch 1989; Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Holzer 2001). The main controversy is about the nature of the slowdown--if not the cessation--of progress since the 1980s.

To account for the stagnating racial wage disparity, two contrasting perspectives have been proposed. According to the first, the recent rise in racial inequality is attributable to growth in higher education and increasing inequality in the labor force as a whole (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993; Smith 1993). Progress is lacking simply because African Americans do not benefit from the "rising skill premium," due to poor education. Couch and Daly (2002) insist that once changes in skill premiums are factored in, the 1990s can be seen as "A Decade of Progress." According to the second proposal, discrimination actually has increased in recent years (Feagin 1991; Thomas, Herring, and Horton 1994; Cancio, Evans, and Maume 1996; Tiendar and Stier 1996; Maume 2004; Western and Pettit 2005). Both explanations suggest monotonic and ubiquitous nationwide transformations, albeit in different directions. Neither entertains the possibility that the failure to reduce wage disparities between racial groups is a result of the dynamic effects of social factors operating in opposite directions

Before the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, racial inequality was typically described as involving institutional differences between the South and North (Myrdal 1944; Wilson 1978; Massey 2007). Since then, such regional factors have largely disappeared from discussions of racial stratification. Instead, the racial inequality after the Civil Rights movement has been

treated primarily as an urban issue related to suburbanization and residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996; McCall 2001; Grodsky and Pager 2001; Charles 2003; Kornrich 2009). This new approach implicitly assumes the same longitudinal trend of changing racial disparity in different regions.

However, there are reasons to believe that the effect of regional variation may have continued to play an important role in racial stratification after the Civil Rights movement. Southerners continued to express high levels of racial prejudice in the 1980s and 1990s (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Schuman and Bobo 1988; Kuklinski et al. 1996). Uneven economic growth between regions is another reason to consider that region is still an important predictor of changing racial disparity. Between 1960 and 1990, population and GDP grew much faster in the South than in the Midwest or Northeast (Pack 2002). Because most blacks still reside in the South, blacks nationwide should be benefiting more than other racial groups from economic development in the South. Why these changes in the South have not led to greater progress in racial wage disparity since the 1980s is a question that requires investigation.

Using the 1983 to 2009 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-MORG), this study suggests that changes in racial wage inequality over time can be understood as a joint outcome of region-specific differences across demographic groups. The next section sketches the background literature, focusing on the meaning of region regarding racial inequality. The subsequent section describes our data and methods. Next, the results are reported, followed by the final section, which summarizes our findings and discusses their implications.

REGIONAL VARIATION IN RACIAL INEQUALITY: SOUTH VERSUS NON-SOUTH

“Categorical mechanisms of racial inequality prevailed throughout the United States until the 1960s, but the means by which exploitation and exclusion were achieved differed in the North and the South” (Massey 2007: 55).

Most prior discussion of the significance of race has focused on whether there has been a secular decline in racial inequality at the national level. However, changes in racial inequality with respect to wages have never been constant across demographic groups. Throughout American history, regional variation in racial inequality between the South and Other Regions has been one of the most influential factors contextualizing race relations and determining the level of racial inequality (Du Bois 1994; Myrdal 1944; Wilson 1978). All eleven Southern states that seceded from the U.S. between 1861 to 1865 to form the Confederate States of America were slave states. These states oppressed their black populations substantially more than other states. The legacy of a racially oppressive South endured for many years.

Economic development (measured by per capita income) in the South had fallen substantially behind that in other regions (Pack 2002). The lagging economy and the racially oppressive culture doubly disadvantaged Southern blacks, and it provided a substantial incentive for many to flee the South (Tolnay 2003; Eichenlaub et al. 2010). Smith and Welch (1989) attribute the reduction in the racial wage disparity between 1940 and 1980 primarily to black migration from the South to the North. Indeed, traditional sociological theories of the development of racial inequality have paid considerable attention to regional causes and their historical context (e.g., Myrdal 1944; Wilson 1978; Massey 2007).

On the other hand, regional variation has rarely been mentioned in recent discussions of changes in racial wage inequality. Racial inequality after the Civil Rights movement era has been

treated mainly as an urban problem, because large black populations living in metropolitan areas have been segregated from the white populations, which moved to the suburbs. Wilson (1996) argues that the main issue for black men is joblessness in the inner-city ghettos, a problem caused by structural shifts in the distribution of job opportunities in industry. Massey and Denton (1993) regard the racial segregation inside metropolitan areas as a principal organizational feature of labor markets. Following this new tradition, many other studies of racial inequality have used the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as their unit of analysis (e.g., McCall 2001; Grodsky and Pager 2001; Kornrich 2009).

In his textbook, Massey (2007) discusses the history of racial stratification before the U.S. Civil Rights movement in terms of the difference between the South, where racial subordination was maintained by segregation laws passed by Southern legislatures as well as informal social practices and cultural understandings, and the North, where the linchpin of racial inequality was residential segregation. In his discussion of racial stratification in the post-Civil-Rights era, however, Massey trivializes regional factors. Racial inequality since the 1980s has been treated as a primarily local phenomenon, with racial problems such as segregation in housing (Massey and Denton 1993), mismatches between skills and available jobs (Handel 2003), discrimination by suburban employers (Holzer 2001), mortgage discrimination (Munnell et al. 1996), and racial profiling by police (Western 2006) being relegated to the cities.

Whereas the possible role of regional variables in perpetuating these problems has been absent from recent studies, historical variables are frequently included in research on Southern racial politics (Roscigno and Tomaskovic-Devey 1994). Scholars are well aware of the persistent regional variations in terms of industry structure and occupation distribution (Burr, Galle, and Fossett 1991; Cohn and Fossett 1995), and researchers have addressed the

idiosyncrasies of Southern race relations and their economic consequences (e.g., Roscigno and Tomaskovic-Devey 1994; Messner, Baller and Zevenbergen 2005). However, none of these studies challenge the legitimacy of studying racial inequality as a national phenomenon. There are studies that connected region with racial issues, but they are focused on rural poverty (e.g., Carol 1996; Duncan 1999).

This omission of regional factors may be associated with the assumption that racial prejudice no longer distinguishes whites in the South and the non-South. Drawing on data from the General Social Survey from 1972 to 1984, Firebaugh and Davis (1988) argue that racial prejudice declined more rapidly in the South than in other regions of the country. Regional differences in voter registration have sharply declined since the early 1970s (Fullerton and Borch 2008). The overt prejudice so strikingly conspicuous in the South before the Civil Rights movement has largely subsided, to be replaced by a more subtle and covert (thus invisible) form of racism in all regions of the country (Bonilla-Silva 1996; Western 2006; Quillian 2006; Massey 2007). Given these developments, region can no longer be cited as the best predictor of racial attitudes or racial inequality (Schuman and Bobo 1988). Thus, it would be a mistake to perceive the South as substantially different from other parts of the U.S. (Shafer and Johnson 2006).

Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the distinction between the South and other regions is still useful for studies of racial wage inequality after the Civil Rights movement. Falk and Rankin (1992) demonstrate that being black was more costly in the Black Belt than other areas in the 1980s, and much of the difference in earnings between blacks and whites can be explained by regional variables. Firebaugh and Davis (1988) and Schuman and Bobo (1988) point out that Southerners continued to manifest extreme racial prejudice in the 1980s. Controlling for social desirability bias, Kuklinski et al. (1996) found that even in the 1990s,

racial prejudice was more frequent among Southern white men than Northern whites. If so, there was still more room for improvement in the South than in other regions. As overt racial prejudice has steadily declined in the Southern states, we should expect to see a corresponding decline in racial inequality in the South, even though it is slowed down in other regions.

Differences in the rate of economic growth in different regions of the country is another reason to expect that regional factors are playing an important role in racial wage inequality. Between 1980 and 2006, the population in the South increased by 45%, compared to only 11% and 12% in the Northeast and Midwest respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2007). For the same period, the Gross State Product (GSP) increased by 138% in the South, compared to 112% in the Northeast and 88% in the Midwest.¹ All but two of the 50 fastest-growing metropolitan areas in the U.S. are in the South and West, and almost all of the slowest-growing ones are in the Northeast and Midwest (Pack 2002). These statistics reinforce the popular distinction in the media between the Sun Belt and the Rust Belt. The recent economic restructuring in the U.S., often labeled the New Economy, may be having a different impact in different regions. While company headquarters and manufacturing sectors in the North were having extreme difficulty coping with change, “Divisions of the corporation farthest away from the head office were better able to respond to change because they were less in the grip of the old conventions and norms” (Barnes 1999:16). The New Economy could be facilitating the decline of racial inequality in the South, because flattened (thus less stratified) organizations can be established rather easily in the South as part of economic restructuring.

Because the majority of the U.S. black population still resides in the South, the black population as a whole should benefit more than other racial groups from the economic

¹ The GSPs were computed based on information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at <http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/>

development of the South. How much the black population can take advantage of this growth depends on how these economic resources are distributed across racial barriers. If race relations continue to improve in the South, Southern blacks should enjoy the double advantage of a growing Southern economy and improving race relations, which together should lead to a further reduction in racial inequality nationwide.

Why this economic development in the South has not led to more noticeable progress in racial wage disparity since the 1980s is a question worth investigating. Could it be due to the appearance of the more covert form of racial prejudice in the South? The emergence of the Republican Party in the South since the Civil Rights movement might also be associated with this heightened covert prejudice. One would expect the increase in racial prejudice to lead to an increase in racial inequality in the South at the same time it is declining in other regions. The reverse is also possible: an increase in racial inequality in other regions accompanied by a decline in the South. Such a reversal could be explained by the shrinking manufacturing base and the reduction of middle-class blue-collar jobs in these other regions having a disproportionately deleterious impact on blacks (Lichter 1989; Wilson 1996).

THE REGION AS AN INSTITUTION

It is necessary to develop a comprehensive explanation of the changing (or stagnating) racial wage disparity between whites and blacks in the context of the historically uneven between-region progress in race relations with respect to racial norms, politics, and economic development. To meet this objective, we conceive of regions in an institutionalized context (Leicht and Jenkins 2007). This is not to deny the merit of studying trends in racial inequality as a whole, nor do we reject the value of research on residential segregation. However, we argue

that the evolution of racial wage disparity can best be understood emphasizing the interaction between the national and regional dynamics of institutional constraints.

The failure to consider the effects of regional differences on racial inequality is consistent with the assumptions of neoclassical economics, according to which locality and region are assumed to be homogenous and to function independently of time (Beggs and Villemez 2001:504). However, employment relations are not homogeneous across regions; rather, they are decentralized (Beggs and Villemez 2001). Labor market phenomena (including racial inequality) cannot be understood as a generic forum for wage labor exchanges governed by ubiquitous laws. Rather, they are an “evolution of embedded social economies geographically (and socially) segmented” (Hayter 2004:98).

The institutional approach to analysis of the labor market considers the background rules and norms that enable the market to operate. “[T]he institutional mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement of formal rules of the state organizations constitute a potent causal force” (Alba and Nee 2003:53). The Civil Rights movement and ensuing legislation imposed various constraints on the labor market. Thus, the associated institutional mechanisms “have increased the cost of discrimination in nontrivial ways” (Alba and Nee 2003:54). Moreover, “the more important institutional changes are those that have not only increased the cost of discrimination but also led to changes in values” (Alba and Nee 2003:57). The institutional constraints referred to above were national in scope. If institutional change at the national level is a major force that defines differences in the extent of racial inequality across regions, regional differences in racial inequality would be expected to gradually decline until full integration is achieved. This process in turn would be expected to reduce racial inequality in the South to its level in other regions.

“Region as an institution” means that race relations are constrained by region-specific

historical events involving culture, politics, and the economic environment (Lobao et al. 2007; Leicht and Jenkins 2007). It also reflects the recognition that race relations are constrained by the legal and social changes at the national level that were described in the previous paragraph.

Based on this reasoning, we offer the following postulates.

First, racial wage inequality as a labor market phenomenon is governed by both national and regional factors. As demonstrated by Alba and Nee (2003) and Massey (2007), the changes in laws and norms that resulted from the Civil Rights movement had a profound impact on all regions of the U.S and thus were national in scope. However, institutional constraints did not quickly eliminate the regional factors that played unique roles in synthesizing, coordinating, and experimenting with race relations in particular regions. Instead, the effects of these national institutional changes were implemented and experienced differently in different regions. Uneven economic development, de-industrialization in traditional manufacturing areas, changes in the political environment, the rise of the Republican Party, and cultural changes such as evangelicalism created new regional dynamics that supplemented the existing regional constraints. The economic scene in the Rust Belt, combined with changes in public attitudes toward affirmative action in the Midwest, formed a unique milieu that distorted race relations in the respective regions. In this case, racial inequality would not uniformly decrease or increase across regions. That is, the substantial racial inequality in the South would not decrease to the level that was found in other regions, but instead move toward the integration into a new level of racial inequality that other regions have developed.

In sum, we argue that to achieve a more thorough comprehension of the implications of the stagnating quest for racial equality, it is essential that regional differences be addressed in a historical context. The present study is one attempt to reinvigorate this tradition of examining

racial inequality as the result of regionally embedded social relations. Although a fully articulated theoretical framework linking national versus regional labor market adjustments is beyond the scope of our study, we demonstrate herein that a disaggregated analysis can shed important new light on the recurring issue of race relations in the U.S. in the last quarter of the 20th Century.

METHODS

Data

The data for the study is obtained from the 1983 to 2009 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG). Although the CPS-ORG series began in 1979, we began our data from 1983, because the CPS added questions on union membership (one of our control variables) in this year. Major changes were also made in 1983 to the questions about occupation and industry. We limit our sample to employed non-Hispanic white and black males. Self-employed and non-civilian workers are excluded. We limit the age range to 20 to 49 years, because these are the prime years for employment in the labor market, and the employment rate for male workers starts to drop substantially when they reach 50. Racial differences in employment between white and black men also start dropping at this age, as whites are more likely than blacks to opt for early retirement (Thomas et al. 1994). Our main dependent variable is hourly wage, which is adjusted for inflation based on the Consumer Price Index. We excluded all imputed wages from our analysis.²

Analyses

To examine whether racial wage inequality continued to shrink from 1983 to 2009, we

² Analyses with imputed wages only enhance the conclusion we made here. The results can be obtained from the author upon request.

estimated the following model:

$$y_{it} = c + \alpha \text{Black}_{it} + \beta \text{Time}_t + \gamma \text{Black}_{it} * \text{Time}_t + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is the log hourly wage for individual i at time t . Black_{it} is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual worker is a black man (1) or a white man (0). Time_t is anchored at 1983. α represents the wage disadvantage for black men at $\text{Time}_t = 0$ (1983), β denotes the average annual wage growth for all workers, and γ is the deviation of average annual wage growth rates from β for black men. If the wage gap between white and black men decreased from 1983 to 2009, the coefficient of $\text{Black}_{it} * \text{Time}_t$, or γ , will be significantly positive; if the gap grew during this period, γ will be significantly negative.

Equation 1 does not control for covariates related to labor productivity. By adding these control variables, we can estimate how much of the change in racial wage inequality (i.e., γ) can be explained by the covariates. Equation 2, which represents the full model, includes the control variables and their interaction with time:

$$y_{it} = c + \alpha \text{Black}_{it} + \beta \text{Time}_t + \gamma \text{Black}_{it} * \text{Time}_t + \sum \delta_j X_{ijt} + \sum \zeta_j X_{ijt} * \text{Time}_t + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

where X_{ijt} is control variable j for individual i at time t , and $X_{ijt} * \text{Time}_t$ is the interaction between j and t . Thus, ζ_j measures the effect of time changes on control variable j , examples of which are the rising skill levels of highly educated workers and region-based economic development. Other control variables include the four Education categories (less than high school [LTHS]; high school graduate [HSG]; some college [SC]; bachelor degree or higher [BA+]), Age, Age²,

Marital Status, Region (New England; Middle Atlantic; East North Central; West North Central; South Atlantic; East South Central; West South Central; Mountain; and Pacific), Central City, Manufacturing Sector, Public Sector, Union Membership, and Occupation (Manager; Professional; Technician; Administrative Clerk; Sales/service; Skilled Agriculture/forestry Worker; Crafts Worker; Operator/assembler; Elementary Laborer). Occupational coding in the CPS-ORG was fundamentally altered in 2003, making it difficult to create a consistent classification scheme. To circumvent this problem, we change all the occupational codes to conform to the 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO), single-digit format, by adopting the coding scheme of the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International (Ruggles et al. 2010).

To account for the regional variation of racial wage disparity, we divided the sample into two regions: South and Other Regions, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.³ South consists of 16 states (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) and the District of Columbia. We do not claim that the Census Bureau definition is the only feasible one. Regional boundaries are very fluid, unlike those of nations or states. We use the Census Bureau definition mostly for statistical convenience. To check the robustness of our results, we compared our results to those based on other definitions of regional boundaries, finding basically the same results. To investigate variability in racial wage disparity as a function of education and age, we further divide the sample into three educational groups (High School or

³ Regional differences in population growth and economic development since 1970 have usually been assessed by comparing the South, West, Northeast, and Midwest (Pack 2002). We chose South versus Other Regions because of the history of race relations between whites and blacks. We nonetheless performed supplementary analyses using the four-region classification and found that results are similar to what we report for the primary classification.

Less; Some College; Bachelor or Higher) and three age groups (20-29, 30-39, and, 40-49). We then estimate equations 1 and 2 separately for each of these 18 subgroups.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Divergence and Convergence of the Racial Wage Gap over Time

Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics. Racial differences in education and occupation decrease between 1983-85 and 2007-09, as measured by the Duncan Dissimilarity Index. The number of black workers with less than a high school education decreases substantially during this period, and the proportion of professionals grows faster among black workers than white workers. However, the racial wage gap increases slightly, from .251 (2.151-1.900) in 1983-85 to .265 (2.208-1.943) in 2007-09. The mean log hourly wage increases between 1983-85 and 2007-09 for both whites and blacks, but the increase is slightly greater for whites.

[Table 1 around here]

[Figure 1 around here]

Figure 1(A) presents a more complete picture of the changes in the mean wage for white and black men during the above time period, although the wages fluctuate with the business cycle. Figure 1(C) presents the breakdown by race and region. In the early 1980s, the mean wages for whites and Northern blacks are quite similar, whereas the mean wage for Southern blacks is substantially lower than for the other groups. The gaps between Northern blacks and both Northern and Southern whites are much smaller than between Northern blacks and Southern blacks. In the late 2000s, however, the pattern of wage gaps is much different. Over the 26 years, the mean wage for black men in the other regions declined, whereas they increased for both whites and Southern blacks. As a result, the mean wage for each race across regions converged in

the late 2000s, whereas the mean wage across races diverged. By 2009, the regional differences within each race completely disappeared. The only discernable wage gap is the racial wage disparity.

[Figure 2 around here]

The racial wage gaps shown in Figure 1 are not controlled for productivity-related wage determinants. Figure 2 shows the effects of being a black man net of the two most common wage determinants: Education and Age (plus Age²). The y-axis of Figure 2 scales the disadvantage for black men as log hourly wage. The downward slope indicates a rise in the net racial gap, and the upward slope signals a declining net gap. We run a separate regression model for each year to control for year-specific effects of education and age.

As shown in Figure 2(A), racial inequality seems to have stayed constant at the national level with education and age controlled. However, when the wage gap is separated by region, as in Figure 2(B), very different trends emerge. The racial wage gap narrowed over time in the South but widened in the other regions. Therefore, the consistent racial wage gap shown in Figure 2(A) is actually the cancellation of two contrasting regional trends. Figure 2(B) shows that these trends are linear within each region; that is, racial inequality seems to have declined linearly in the South and increased linearly within Other Regions.

In Figure 2(C), the wage gap is broken down by education and age. For education, it is hard to find any nonrandom patterns. For age, the figure shows that the wage disadvantages for blacks declined for younger workers, whereas for older workers it remained the same or even increased. In other words, the negative effect of growing old among black men was much more pronounced in the late 2000s than in the 1980s. These results indicate that there are nontrivial interactions of changes in racial inequality over time with and region and age.

Declining Racial Inequality in the South and Growing Racial Inequality in Other Regions

[Table 2 around here]

Table 2 presents the results of our multivariate analyses. The first panel shows the control variables for each model, with the dependent variable being log hourly wages. The second panel displays the estimated results for the whole sample, and third and fourth panels show the estimates for the South and Other Regions separately. To save space, only the coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time are presented.⁴

Model 1 controls for Time only. The coefficients of Time estimate the annual wage growth rate. Model 2 adds race and its interaction with time. Model 3 adds pre-market covariate controls. The coefficient of Black quantifies the disadvantage of being black in 1983, with the other variables held constant. Of primary interest is the coefficient of Black*Time.⁵ A significant positive coefficient means that the wage growth rate is higher for blacks than whites (i.e., narrowing racial gap), whereas a significant negative coefficient means that wage growth is lower for blacks than whites (widening racial gap). Net racial effects are typically measured without controlling for labor market factors, such as public sector employment, manufacturing sector employment, occupation, and union membership, that are endogenous to wage determination. Nonetheless, we measure Model 4 to assess the extent to which these factors influenced changes in the racial gap.

For the entire sample, the coefficient of Black*Time is slightly positive in Model 2, where other variables are not controlled for. This finding suggests that the racial wage gap declined from 1983 to 2009. However, when we included pre-market covariates in Model 3, the

⁴ See Appendix Table 1 for a full report of Model 4.

⁵ To see if the changes in racial inequality over time were curvilinear, we added Black*Time² to the four models. In no case was the Black*Time² coefficient significant.

positive effect of Black*Time disappears. Adding the labor market variables in Model 4 does not alter these results.

Next, we estimate the effects separately for the South and Other Regions. Although the wage growth rate was positive in both regional categories, as shown in Model 1, the rate is more than three times higher in the South (.0046) than in the other regions (.0013), indicating faster economic growth in the South.⁶ In Model 2, the coefficients of Black are, as expected, all negative for both regions, and the magnitude of the effect is greater in the South than in the other regions (i.e., the racial wage gap was larger in the South in 1983). These findings again appear in Models 3 and 4.

With regard to our main interest, the coefficients of Black*Time for the South are all positive regardless of model specifications, whereas they are all negative for Other Regions. Neither the directions nor the significance levels of the estimated coefficients of Black*Time are altered by introducing the pre-market covariates (Model 3) or of the labor market factors (Model 4) as controls. The mean wage rises faster for blacks than for whites in the South, whereas in the other regions the mean wage for blacks rises slower than for whites, and in some cases they even decline for blacks. Recall that Models 3 and 4 controlled not only for the covariates but also for their interactions with time. The coefficients of Black*Time reported in Table 2 are, thus, net estimates after taking into account the uneven wage growth influenced by education, age, marital status, region, public/private sector, industry, occupation, and union membership. In other words, the effects of rising inequality, at least in terms of these variables, are controlled for. The results

⁶ The coefficient of Time is consistently higher for South across models. However, we caution that these coefficients are not directly comparable across models. The coefficients of Time in Table 2 are the wage growth rates for the reference group. Because the interaction between the covariates and time were added to Models 3 and 4, the reference groups are different across models.

shown in Table 2 demonstrate that the racial disadvantage for blacks consistently declined in the South from 1983 to 2009, while at the same time it was growing in Other Regions.⁷

In none of the models do the pre-market covariates change the coefficient of Black*Time for the South. On the other hand, the labor market covariates account for about 26% ($= [.0023 - .0018] / .0023$) of the changes in the South. That is, 26% of the decline in the racial wage gap in the South can be explained by the changes in labor market processes, such as reduction in occupational segregation and the different wage growth rates in different market sectors. This finding is at least partly consistent with Huffman and Cohen's (2004) finding that job segregation is the major cause of racial inequality with respect to wages. For the other regions, the pre-market covariates explain 43% ($= [.0042 - .0024] / .0042$) of the relative decline in wages for black men (a rising racial gap). In Model 4, labor market characteristics account for an additional 29% of the rise in the racial wage gap.

After accounting for all of these covariates in Model 4, however, the wage growth for black men for the other regions was still significantly lower than for their white counterparts by .0017 log dollars per year, which amounts to .0442 log dollars for the 26 year period. In the South, the wage growth rate for black men is significantly higher than for whites by .0018 log dollars per year ($= .0468$ log dollars for 26 years). In sum, the results of Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that these distinct regional patterns can be accounted for neither by cross-sectional differences in education, marital status, central city residence, industry, and occupation, nor by the longitudinal changes in education, occupation, marital status, and union membership. These results strongly suggest that there are secular trends in the racial gap over time that depend on

⁷ When estimated separately for the four regions cited by Pack (2002) using the specifications for Model 3, coefficients of Black*Time are negative for every region except the South: -.0021 for the Northeast; -.0040 for the Midwest; and, -.0008 for the West.

region.

Some may wonder whether the above findings hold using different definitions of the South, or whether there are variations across sub-regions in the South. To address these concerns, we estimate the models in Table 2 using different definitions of the South. We use, first, the following five states from the deep South: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina; second, we use the seven Southern states that originally seceded to form the Confederate State of America (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Florida, and Texas); third, we use the final 11 states in the Confederate States of America (adding Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee to the previous seven states). The declining racial wage gap remains evident regardless of how the South is defined. (See Appendix Table 2 for the details.) Finally, we divide the South into South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. There were small differences, but the basic patterns are the same across these sub-regions (see Appendix Table 3).

Blacks' Greater Wage Gains in the South and Losses in the Non-South

[Table 3 around here]

Why, then, did the racial gap decline in the South and grow in the other regions? Is the reduction in the South due to the faster rate growth in wages for blacks (although wages for white are also growing), or is it because of the decline in wages for whites (with wages for blacks being stable)? Is the increase of the racial gap in Other Regions due to a rise in wages for whites (with wages for blacks remaining stagnant) or to a decline in wages for blacks (with wages rising for whites)? To answer these questions, we refer the reader to Table 3, which shows the changes in the racial gap between 1983 and 2009 estimated by the three models of Table 2 and divides them into two components: wage changes for whites and wage changes for blacks. The

predictions were based on the assumption that all the covariates are constant across time and between races. Therefore, the mean wage estimates reported in Table 3 reflect only the uneven net wage growth rates by race, after controlling for changes in the covariates over time and their distributional differences between races.

According to Model 2, the mean wage for whites in the South between 1983 and 2009 grows by .101 log dollars, whereas for blacks it grows by .169 log dollars. In other words, the racial wage gap declines by .068 log dollars. Most of the growth in wages for both races can be explained by the pre-market covariates. In Model 3, the mean wage for whites, after controlling for the pre-market covariates and their interaction with time, is reduced by .014 log dollars, whereas for blacks it increases by .044 log dollars. This clear reduction in the racial gap (-.059 log dollars) is due mainly to the growth in wages for blacks (.044 log dollars), although the slight decline in wages for whites also makes a contribution (-.014 log dollars).

The story is very different in Other Regions, where the mean wage for whites is similar to their mean wage in the South from Model 3 (a decline of .014 log dollars). Surprisingly, the mean wage for blacks in the current analysis decreases by .091 log dollars, almost 10%. The rise in the racial gap in Other Regions, therefore, can be attributed mainly to the non-trivial reduction in wages for blacks. Adding the labor market covariates to Model 4 does not change the findings.

Aggravated Cumulative Disadvantage for Black Men in the South and Other Regions

Figure 2(D) demonstrates that the changes in racial wage inequality vary across age groups. The fact that racial inequality decline among 20 year olds and is stagnant or grows among 30 and 40 year olds suggests that the cumulative disadvantage of being black (Rosenfeld 1992; Thomas et al. 1994; Neal and Johnson 1996; Maume 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2005; DiPrete 2006) has been aggravated over this time period. Previous studies have not addressed the

possibility that the extent of the cumulative disadvantage might *increase* over time, but Figure 2(D) hints at this possibility. Given the regional variation discussed above, it is necessary to assess how these age differences in wage inequality are intertwined with the regional trends. Even though there is no evidence that changes in racial inequality vary across education levels, as shown in Figure 2(C), we believe it is important to ask whether the observed effects of region and age are conditioned by education. To this end, we estimate the effects of being a black male on wages across regions using groups defined by education and age for each region.

[Figure 3 around here]

Figure 3 shows the results. The model specification in this figure is identical to that in Figure 2(C). In all the groups the racial gap is much smaller in the late 2000s than the early 1980s. For the education groups, the same contrasting regional trends are observed: racial gaps in the South decline while they are growing in the other regions.

The regional differences in racial inequality almost completely disappear within each of the three age groups, but the patterns differ across these groups. For ages 20-29, this regional convergence is due to a *decline* in racial inequality in the South. Racial inequality in Other Regions does not change over time. For ages 40-49, however, the convergence is due mainly to the *increase* in racial inequality in Other Regions; racial inequality does not change much in the South. The common effect in both regional categories was the diverging racial inequality across age groups. In 1983, the disadvantage of being black is similar across age groups within each regional category, ranging from .20 to .25 (gap=.05) in the South, and from .09 to .10 (gap=.01) in the other regions. Thus, the greatest variability is across regions. In 2009, however, racial inequality does vary across age groups within the same region. For both regional categories, the racial inequality means range from .09 to .23 (gap=.14). In both regional categories, there is

more racial inequality for older workers, a sign of aggravated cumulative disadvantage.

[Table 4 around here]

[Table 5 around here]

In Table 4, we report the results of formal tests of changes in racial inequality as a function of education and age. For each region, we divide the sample into nine groups (3 Education x 3 Age) and estimate Model 3 (Table 2) for each. Using the parameters shown in Table 3, we analyze the changes in the racial wage gap between 1983 and 2009 separately for whites and blacks.

These results are presented in Table 5. The most important finding is the very large variability in the coefficients of Black*Time across groups. In the South, for black workers age 20-29 with less than a high school education, the racial wage gap declines during this period by .1118 log dollars ($=.0043*26$), due to the faster rate of growth in wages for blacks generally. In the other regions, however, for blacks age 40-49 lacking a high school education, the racial wage gap increases by .0988 ($-.0038*26$) log dollars, because of the general decline in wages for blacks.

As shown in Table 5, the racial wage gap declines for all nine groups in the South. However, the causes of the reduction vary from group to group. For high school dropouts, high school graduates and, and some college educated workers, the reduction is the combined result of the small reduction in wages for whites and the substantial increase in wages for blacks. For highly educated workers, the reduction in racial inequality is attributable to the faster growth in wages for blacks.

The changes in the other regions are more complex. The rise of racial inequality is obvious for the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups, but not for the 20-29 age group. Within age groups,

the changes in racial inequality are shown to vary as a function of education. The decline in wages for less-educated workers in Other Regions can be attributed to de-industrialization, de-unionization, and the disappearance of high-paying manufacturing jobs in the Midwest and the Northeast. Yet, the negative impact of this change seems to be greater for blacks than whites. On the other hand, the growth in wages for well-educated workers can be a reflection of the rise in skill premium. Yet again, in Other Regions, wage growth is limited to white workers. Therefore, Wilson's (1996) speculation that the suffering of less-educated blacks is concentrated in the Midwest and the Northeast because of joblessness in the ghettos, and that well-educated blacks may be doing quite well, is only partly right. The relative wage disadvantage of blacks in the other regions is not limited to those with little education; it applies to all education levels.

In sum, any sweeping generalizations about changes in racial wage inequality (regardless of magnitude or direction) from 1983 to 2009 are too simplistic. Nonetheless, we do find rather consistent regional differences. There are many significant positive estimates for the groups in the South, but not a single significant positive Black*Time estimate for the groups in Other Regions. Aggravated cumulative advantages frequently appear in both regional categories, but whether they are due to the worsening racial disadvantage among older workers or the improvement among younger workers depends on the region.

The Effects of Rising Total Wage Inequality on the Racial Wage Disparity

Although the results presented above are net effects controlled for education, occupation, and marital status, the possibility remains that the changes in racial wage disparity across regions are the result of changes in total wage inequality, assuming the conditional wage distributions are different for blacks and whites. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) found that most of the growth in inequality in recent decades is attributable to the residual variance. Thus, even though our

previous models control for education and other covariates, if the growing inequality is due to differences in unobserved skills, which is not included in the previous models, we cannot rule out the possibility that the findings reported so far are a mere reflection of rising total wage inequality.

Indeed, the extent and direction of wage inequality changes differ across groups. For example, during the sample period, wage inequality rises more than 20% among college graduates (bachelors or advanced) in their 40s, but it decrease by more than 10% among college-educated workers in their 20s. To address this concern, we convert all the log hourly wages to percentile ranks and then estimate the models described in Table 3. The conversion is conducted separately for each of the nine groups in each region for each year, such that the changes in wage inequality over time would have no impact on the relative positions of blacks across wage distribution. Essentially, there are no meaningful differences between the results with log hourly wages (Table 3) and percentile ranks of wages (Appendix Table 4). The directions and statistical significance (at $\alpha=.05$) of the coefficients are identical in all cases. Therefore, contrary to the increasing skill premium hypothesis, the changing racial wage disparity across regions cannot be relegated to increasing wage inequality.

DISCUSSION

This study investigate the consequences of being a black man in the U.S. from 1983 to 2009, considering historical contexts of regional differences in race relations. We argued for a new approach to understanding the trends in racial wage disparity, one that considers the effects of regional contexts. There are several noteworthy new findings . First, racial inequality continuously declines in the South from 1983 to 2009 while growing elsewhere in the U.S. This

result is robust in the face of different model specifications, and both before and after controlling for productivity-related, demographic, geographic, and labor market covariates. Second, racial economic disadvantage increases for older workers and decreases for younger workers, leading to an aggravated cumulative disadvantage against black men. However, the pattern of this disadvantage differs across regions. Third, the increase in total wage inequality in population since 1983 is not meaningfully associated with changes in the racial wage gap.

Reintroducing the Regional Context

In their seminal paper, Massey and Denton (1993) proposed that without residential segregation, economic restructuring in urban areas would not have produced the disastrous social and economic outcomes experienced by blacks. If they were correct that residential segregation mediates and exacerbates the effect of structural changes (Massey and Denton 1993), the reduction in residential segregation would have led to an (albeit small) reduction in racial wage disparity across the U.S. Contrary to this expectation, and in spite of the fact that the residential segregation of whites and blacks in the 50 largest U.S. metropolitan areas in all four census regions was attenuated to various degrees between 1980 and 2000 (Charles 2003:172), changes in racial wage disparity in our data are not homogeneous across regions and in fact go in opposite directions. Likewise, despite the increase in residential segregation between whites and Asians (Charles 2003), there is no evidence that the economic gap between these two races has grown (Sakamoto et al. 2009).

Our results suggest that changes in racial inequality cannot be understood by appealing to micro-metropolitan factors such as residential segregation or joblessness in the inner-city ghetto. By no means, however, do we deny the importance of residential segregation and its capacity to account for the *state* of race relations in the U.S. Instead, to account for the *trend* of racial

inequality, we submit that the analyses of micro-units must be embedded in a broader context that incorporates regional differences in economic development and economic opportunity over time. Studies of racial inequality must not only become more contextually sensitive to, but also emphasize, regional economic and historical variability.

Although we recognize that the evolution of race relations occurs at multiple levels (i.e., national, regional, and micro-local), we argue that regional factors really set the trend. When economic restructuring is organized differently across regions, it is particularly likely that race relations will also develop differently across regions. How people behave is shaped by social norms, attitudes, conventions, and culture, all of which are mediated to a large extent by geographical proximity. It is not by accident that the elements of the electoral map for U.S. presidential elections were dictated by region--albeit not the regions defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Barnes (1999) found that economic variables such as workplace practices, technological choices, and corporate strategies are “embedded” within specific local cultural contexts. Regions create an “institutional thickness” through which region-specific institutional structures are interlinked (Amin and Thrift 1999).

In American history, no minority population has ever been distributed evenly across regions. Thus, a regional approach should be fruitful not only for the study of African Americans, but also of other minority groups such as Asian Americans and Hispanics. Historically, the majority of the Asian-American population in the U.S. has been concentrated in the Pacific region (Sakamoto et al. 2009; Kim and Sakamoto 2010). More than half of the U.S. Hispanic population is found in the four states bordering Mexico (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). As Lobao et al. (2007) suggest, studies conducted at the level of the region, larger than the city but smaller than the state or nation, could shed important new light on racial

inequality. Massey and Capoferro (2008) propose a similar approach for studies of settlement patterns among new immigrants. We echo Falk and Rankin's (1992:310) suggestion that "the concept of region, one that earlier sociologists found so useful... should be reintroduced." The apparent regional concentration of racial minorities requires both theoretical and empirical advances that incorporate regional characteristics to account for changes in race relations.

Implications of the Worsening Racial Inequality in Regions Other than the South

More surprising and in greater need of attention than the racial wage gap in the South, is the gap in Other Regions. In both regional categories, the proportion of white populations with negative opinions about blacks has steadily, although not necessarily linearly, declined since the late 1970s (Griffin and Hargis 2008). White-black differences in education level and occupation have also been slashed. One would expect all these attitudinal, educational, other socioeconomic changes to have driven the level of racial inequality down since the 1980s; our results show just the opposite, but only outside the South. What does this increase in racial inequality outside the South imply?

Alba (2009) speculates that the color line in America will continue to blur, because the departure of baby boomers from the workforce in the next couple decades will open up the labor market in many of the best-paying occupations, and these new openings will be filled by racial minorities. He argues that racial tensions ease and boundaries dissolve because of non-zero-sum mobility in which "members of lower-situated groups can move upward without affecting the life chances of the members of well-established ones" (Alba 2009:15). Ironically, the situation outside the South supports Alba's argument in reverse: when economic prospects are poor, a racial minority can be the main victim. As the economic situation in the manufacturing sector worsens in densely populated areas of the Rust Belt, the once relatively good racial equality in

these areas will rapidly deteriorate. When economic opportunities vanish, economic resources become less abundant. These detrimental effects do not seem to affect the economic fortunes of less-educated inner city blacks exclusively; even well-educated blacks and, indeed, all racial minorities are negatively influenced.

The deterioration of racial equality outside the South and the aggravated cumulative disadvantage among blacks signals that the progress achieved in race relations over the last several decades is not rock-solid or irreversible. Such feeble progress can easily be reversed, at least temporarily, especially when whites believe that “the socioeconomic gap between the races has so substantially diminished that it no longer requires explanation”(Griffin and Hargis 2008:127). When whites deny the role of structural forces in creating a racial gap that they see as nonexistent, the deteriorating economic opportunities can have a disproportionately deleterious effect on racial minorities because of the structural forces. Therefore, whether the division between the South and Other Regions in the U.S. will continue to matter in the future, when racial inequality will be more homogeneous across regions, might well depend on how differently regional economic opportunities evolve and how much American society recognizes that race is still a problem.

Aggravated Cumulative Disadvantage

Our results show that the changes in the labor market since the 1980s have led to a heightened cumulative disadvantage for blacks in recent years, although racial inequality continues to ease for younger blacks. The regional variation in the patterns of aggravated cumulative disadvantage for blacks that our results document (specifically, the narrowing gap for younger workers in the South and the widening racial gap for older workers outside the South) illustrates how a national trend can manifest differently in different places.

It is beyond the scope of this study to identify the labor market mechanisms that might explain the regional differences in aggravated cumulative disadvantages we found . Nonetheless, we propose several possibilities for future research. First, the evolution of American racism from an overt to a covert form may have increased the disadvantages for blacks. It is easier to enforce equal opportunity for entry-level jobs than for promotions. This is because easily observed markers such as education, race, and sex are more important for initial employment, whereas less easily observed or transferable aptitudes or skills are more important for promotions (Rosenfeld 1992; DiPrete and Krecker 1991; DiPrete and Soule 1988). If the change from overt to covert racism were not accompanied by a reduction in “total” racism, then the increased employment opportunities for black workers would be cancelled by the lower probability of promotion (Baldi and McBrier 1997) or by various opportunities available to employees inside the firm, such as on-the-job training (Glass 1999). Thus, regional factors converge to decrease racial inequality for the younger generation and increase it for the older generation.

Another possibility is continued discrimination in hiring practices. Given the decline of internal labor markets in the U.S. (Cappelli 2001) and the importance of firm size (Hollister 2004), workers are more likely to change firms during their careers, and firms are more likely fill their upper management positions outside the U.S., which increases the average number of new job searches per worker. With no change in the level of discrimination in hiring, a simple increase in the number of new job searches can multiply the effects of discrimination. The higher incarceration rates for blacks outside the South may also explain why old cohorts in the North fare worse than their counterparts in the South, as they would have been more likely to experience prison and the negative labor market consequences (Western 2006). Future research on this issue is warranted.

There are many related issues worth serious attention. One is the need for research on the racial wage gap for female workers. We find that regional trends in this gap are the same for women as for men (results not shown here but can be obtained from the author upon request), but a more detailed understanding of this topic requires that researchers consider several confounding factors. For example, unlike male workers whose wages decline except the top decile, wage levels for female workers have increased at almost all deciles during the last several decades (Morris and Western 1999); the growth of female participation in the labor market during this time period is contingent on the level of education (Juhn and Kim 1999). The relation between wage changes and geographic mobility also differs by gender (McKinnish 2008).

Another dimension that would be desirable to incorporate in future studies is the internal migration of racial minorities from one region to another. In recent decades, there has been a marked increase in the likelihood of blacks returning to the South (Stack 1996; Tolnay 2003; Tolnay and Eichenlaub 2006). These black migrants increase the heterogeneity of black Southerners in terms of skill compositions. This heterogeneity may be correlated with wage increases for black males in the South, although we found the same regional trend when we limited our analyses to workers born in each region, using data from the 1980 Integrated Public Use Micro Series and the 2008 American Community Survey datasets,⁸ so that the reduction of racial inequality in the South is not likely to be a simple consequence of return migration.

CONCLUSION

Our results indicate the importance of sociologists considering regional variables in historical context in their studies of race relations in the U.S. Racial inequality has declined in

⁸ The full results can be obtained from the author upon request.

the economically developing South, while it has been increasing in more economically troubled regions outside the South. Our results further indicate that the growth of this undesirable racial inequality is the result of aggravated cumulative disadvantage for blacks that might be closely associated with the hiring and promotion practices of firms. Racial wage disparity as a labor market phenomenon is thus multidimensional. Economic growth rates, industrial and organizational structures, and employment practices are not isomorphic; rather, they are complex, interactive, factors dependent on regional variation, a principal dimension defining historical uniqueness. Given that racial inequality is embedded in these structures (Reskin 2003), sociologists need to do a better job incorporating these contexts in their theories of racial inequality, especially as these contexts relate to regional differences and cumulative disadvantage for blacks.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	White			Black		
	1983-85	2007-09	Change	1983-85	2007-09	Change
Log Hourly Wage ^a	2.151	2.208	.057	1.900	1.943	.043
Log Hourly Wage: South Region	2.092	2.189	.097	1.801	1.930	.129
Log Hourly Wage: Other Regions	2.173	2.215	.042	2.044	1.961	-.083
Education						
Less Than High School	.108	.040	-.068	.225	.058	-.167
High School Graduate	.365	.303	-.062	.402	.381	-.021
Some College	.259	.309	.050	.239	.331	.092
Bachelor	.177	.244	.067	.090	.168	.078
Graduate Degree	.091	.104	.013	.044	.063	.019
(Duncan Dissimilarity) ^c	(.153)	(.118)	(-.035)			
(Duncan Dissimilarity: South Region) ^c	(.174)	(.129)	(-.045)			
(Duncan Dissimilarity: Other Regions) ^c	(.120)	(.107)	(-.013)			
Mean Age	32.733	35.516	2.783	33.052	35.192	2.140
Married	.687	.588	-.099	.606	.444	-.163
Region						
Northeast	.224	.211	-.013	.156	.124	-.032
Midwest	.273	.293	.020	.147	.174	.027
South	.277	.268	-.009	.595	.587	-.008
West	.225	.228	.003	.103	.116	.013
(Duncan Dissimilarity: 9 regions) ^{cd}	(.323)	(.318)	(-.005)			
Central City	.164	.182	.018	.438	.425	-.013
Union Member	.256	.148	-.108	.337	.176	-.161
Public Sector	.157	.143	-.014	.208	.169	-.039
Manufacturing	.291	.182	-.109	.275	.151	-.124
Occupation ^b						
Manager	.129	.163	.034	.060	.096	.036
Professional	.145	.187	.042	.070	.129	.059
Technician	.082	.086	.004	.058	.073	.015
Clerk	.051	.057	.006	.079	.099	.020
Service/Sales	.101	.126	.025	.118	.178	.060
Agri/Fishery	.004	.004	.000	.004	.002	-.002
Craft	.241	.192	-.049	.173	.129	-.044
Operator	.154	.110	-.044	.227	.162	-.065
Elem Worker	.094	.076	-.018	.211	.132	-.079
(Duncan Dissimilarity) ^c	(.235)	(.202)	(-.033)			
(Duncan Dissimilarity: South Region) ^c	(.269)	(.210)	(-.059)			
(Duncan Dissimilarity: Other Regions) ^c	(.204)	(.203)	(-.001)			

Notes: ^a. Inflation adjusted using CPI-U; ^b. Recoded as ISCO-88 one-digit occupation code according to IPUMS International coding scheme (<https://international.ipums.org/international/>); ^c. Duncan dissimilarity index between whites and blacks; ^d. The nine census regions.

Table 2. Changes in the Effects of Being a Black vs. Non-Hispanic White Male on Log Hourly Wages, 1983 to 2009^{ab}

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control Variables^c				
Black		o	o	o
Education/Age			o	o
Marriage			o	o
Geographic Variable			o	o
Market Sector				o
Occupation				o
Union				o
I. Total				
Time	0.0024*** (0.0001)	0.0023*** (0.0001)	0.0037*** (0.0002)	0.0045*** (0.0003)
Black		-0.2614*** (0.0031)	-0.1735*** (0.0027)	-0.1384*** (0.0026)
Black*Time		0.0005* (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Adj_R ²	0.0011	0.0189	0.3468	0.4139
N	1195382	1195382	1195382	1195382
II. South Region				
Time	0.0046*** (0.0001)	0.0042*** (0.0001)	0.0041*** (0.0003)	0.0051*** (0.0004)
Black		-0.2975*** (0.0043)	-0.2158*** (0.0036)	-0.1684*** (0.0035)
Black*Time		0.0023*** (0.0003)	0.0023*** (0.0003)	0.0018*** (0.0003)
Adj_R ²	0.0039	0.0388	0.3584	0.4214
N	359516	359516	359516	359516
III. Other Regions				
Time	0.0013*** (0.0001)	0.0015*** (0.0001)	0.0032*** (0.0002)	0.0034*** (0.0002)
Black		-0.1330*** (0.0048)	-0.1113*** (0.0041)	-0.0966*** (0.0039)
Black*Time		-0.0042*** (0.0004)	-0.0024*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)
Adj_R ²	0.0003	0.0062	0.3353	0.4050
N	835866	835866	835866	835866

Notes: ^a. To save space, only the coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time, and the model R² values are reported; ^b. Other coefficients are omitted from the table; ^c. Control variables include interactions of the listed variables with Time. The four education variables are dummies (ref=BA). Age variables are Age and Age². Geographic variables are the nine regions and Central City (ref=Non-central-city). Market sector variables are Public Sector (ref=Private Sector) and Manufacturing Sector (ref=Non-manufacturing Sector). Occupations consist of nine broadly defined ISCO-88 categories (ref=Managers). South Atlantic is the reference region for South, New England for Other Regions. New England is also the reference for Total.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two-tailed test)

Table 3. Expected Log Hourly Wages for White and Black Men and Expected Changes in Racial Wage Gap, 1983 to 2009

		Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
		A South	B Other Regions	B-A Regional Gap	A South	B Other Regions	B-A Regional Gap	A South	B Other Regions	B-A Regional Gap
White	1983	2.058	2.159	0.101	2.091	2.183	0.092	2.070	2.169	0.099
	2009	2.159	2.196	0.037	2.077	2.155	0.078	2.084	2.168	0.084
	Change	0.101	0.037	-0.064	-0.014	-0.028	-0.014	0.014	0.000	-0.014
Black	1983	1.756	2.025	0.268	1.875	2.072	0.196	1.902	2.072	0.170
	2009	1.925	1.954	0.029	1.920	1.981	0.061	1.962	2.029	0.067
	Change	0.169	-0.070	-0.239	0.044	-0.091	-0.135	0.060	-0.043	-0.104
Racial Gap (=White – Black)	1983	0.302	0.135	-0.167	0.216	0.111	-0.104	0.168	0.097	-0.072
	2009	0.234	0.241	0.008	0.157	0.174	0.017	0.122	0.140	0.018
	Change	-0.068	0.107		-0.059	0.063		-0.046	0.043	

Notes: Expected log hourly wages were computed from estimated coefficients in Table 2. Control variables differ by model. Model 2 uses only race as a control covariate. Model 3 controls for Age, Age², Marital Status, the nine census regions, and Central City. Model 4 adds to the Model 3 controls labor market characteristics such as public sector, manufacturing industry, union, and occupation. Control variable distributions are assumed equal for white and black men and for 1983 and 2009.

Table 4. Changes in the Effects of Being a Black Male on Log Hourly Wages by Education, Age, and Region, 1983 to 2009^a

		South	Other Regions
		Coeffi (st.err) sig	Coeffi (st.err) sig
Control Variables: Black, Age, Marriage, Geographic Variables			
I. High School or less			
(1) Age 20-29	Time	0.0008 (0.0005)	0.0005 (0.0005)
	Black	-0.2097 (0.0064) ***	-0.1494 (0.0085) ***
	Black*Time	0.0043 (0.0005) ***	0.0012 (0.0007)
	N	59201	116546
(2) Age 30-39	Time	0.0002 (0.0013)	-0.0009 (0.0010)
	Black	-0.2396 (0.0076) ***	-0.1233 (0.0094) ***
	Black*Time	0.0032 (0.0006) ***	-0.0026 (0.0007) ***
	N	60273	120668
(3) Age 40-49	Time	-0.0030 (0.0023)	-0.0032 (0.0016) *
	Black	-0.2934 (0.0090) ***	-0.1116 (0.0104) ***
	Black*Time	0.0046 (0.0007) ***	-0.0038 (0.0008) ***
	N	50490	103423
II. Some College			
(1) Age 20-29	Time	0.0013 (0.0006) *	0.0005 (0.0006)
	Black	-0.1483 (0.0108) ***	-0.0712 (0.0104) ***
	Black*Time	0.0036 (0.0008) ***	-0.0001 (0.0008)
	N	35114	91541
(2) Age 30-39	Time	0.0036 (0.0018) *	0.0013 (0.0012)
	Black	-0.2131 (0.0123) ***	-0.0934 (0.0119) ***
	Black*Time	0.0033 (0.0009) ***	-0.0044 (0.0009) ***
	N	33118	85179
(3) Age 40-49	Time	-0.0041 (0.0035)	0.0004 (0.0021)
	Black	-0.2250 (0.0175) ***	-0.1337 (0.0152) ***
	Black*Time	0.0018 (0.0011)	-0.0018 (0.0010)
	N	27129	70555
III. Bachelor Degree or Higher			
(1) Age 20-29	Time	0.0048 (0.0013) ***	0.0021 (0.0010) *
	Black	-0.1700 (0.0188) ***	-0.0715 (0.0203) ***
	Black*Time	0.0036 (0.0013) **	0.0002 (0.0015)
	N	22770	57023
(2) Age 30-39	Time	0.0045 (0.0018) *	0.0002 (0.0012)
	Black	-0.2548 (0.0156) ***	-0.1426 (0.0154) ***
	Black*Time	0.0019 (0.0011)	-0.0037 (0.0011) ***
	N	38637	102800
(3) Age 40-49	Time	0.0102 (0.0034) **	0.0074 (0.0021) ***
	Black	-0.2859 (0.0207) ***	-0.1545 (0.0200) ***
	Black*Time	0.0009 (0.0013)	-0.0025 (0.0013)
	N	32784	88131

Notes: ^a. Model specifications are the same as Model 3 in Table 2. To save space, only coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time, and model R² values are reported. Reference groups are Unmarried and Non-central-city. South Atlantic is the reference region for South, New England for Other Regions.

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two tailed test)

Table 5. Expected Changes in the Racial Wage Gap by Region, Education, and Age, 1983 and 2009

	South			Other Regions		
	Age 20-29	Age 30-39	Age 40-49	Age 20-29	Age 30-39	Age 40-49
I. High School Graduate or Less						
Change in Racial Wage Gap (W-B)	-0.112	-0.082	-0.120	-0.031	0.067	0.099
Change in Wage for White, 2009-1983 (W)	-0.040	-0.039	-0.029	-0.076	-0.094	-0.090
Change in Wage for Black, 2009-1983 (B)	0.072	0.044	0.091	-0.045	-0.161	-0.189
II. Some College						
Change in Racial Wage Gap (W-B)	-0.094	-0.086	-0.047	0.001	0.115	0.047
Change in Wage for White, 2009-1983 (W)	-0.005	-0.038	-0.037	-0.010	-0.048	-0.078
Change in Wage for Black, 2009-1983 (B)	0.089	0.048	0.011	-0.011	-0.163	-0.125
III. Bachelor Degree or Higher						
Change in Racial Wage Gap (W-B)	-0.093	-0.049	-0.022	-0.004	0.097	0.064
Change in Wage for White, 2009-1983 (W)	0.072	0.105	0.053	0.041	0.106	0.056
Change in Wage for Black, 2009-1983 (B)	0.166	0.155	0.075	0.045	0.009	-0.008

Notes: Expected log hourly wages were computed based on the estimated coefficients in Table 3. Control variables are Age, Age², Marital Status, the nine census regions, and Central City. Control variable distributions are assumed equal for white and black men, and for 1983 and 2009.




Figure 1. Mean Log Hourly Wage for White and Black Males Across Years




Figure 2. Estimated Net Effects of Being a Black vs. Non-Hispanic White Male on Log Hourly Wage, Controlled for Education, Age, and Age², 1983-2009

Notes: Analyses in Figures 2(A) and 2(B) controlled for year-specific effects of Age, Age², and Education; Figure 2(C) for Age and Age²; Figure 2(D) for Education.




Figure 3. Estimated Net Effects of Being a Black Male on Log Hourly Wage by Education and Age, 1983-2009

Notes: Analyses in Figure 3(A) controlled for year-specific effects of Age and Age²; Figure 3(B) for Education. Reference group is non-Hispanic white men.

Appendix Table 1. Changes in the Effects of being Black Men on Log Hourly Wage over Time Compared to Non-Hispanic White Men, 1983 to 2009

	Total	South	Other Regions
Time	0.0045*** (0.0003)	0.0051*** (0.0004)	0.0045*** (0.0003)
Black	-0.1384*** (0.0026)	-0.1684*** (0.0035)	-0.0966*** (0.0039)
Black*Time	0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0018*** (0.0003)	-0.0017*** (0.0003)
Education (Ref=LTHS)			
LTHS	-0.3584*** (0.0031)	-0.4092*** (0.0053)	-0.3248*** (0.0039)
HSG	0.1385*** (0.0025)	0.1484*** (0.0040)	0.1217*** (0.0033)
Some Col	0.1872*** (0.0027)	0.2067*** (0.0044)	0.1656*** (0.0035)
Grad	0.4111*** (0.0037)	0.4621*** (0.0066)	0.3791*** (0.0046)
LTHS*Time	-0.0043*** (0.0003)	-0.0037*** (0.0004)	-0.0048*** (0.0003)
HSG*Time	0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0004 (0.0003)
SC *Time	0.0018*** (0.0002)	0.0017*** (0.0004)	0.0021*** (0.0003)
Grad*Time	0.0081*** (0.0003)	0.0078*** (0.0005)	0.0084*** (0.0004)
Age	0.0690*** (0.0004)	0.0624*** (0.0008)	0.0719*** (0.0005)
Age-squared	-0.0008*** (0.0000)	-0.0007*** (0.0000)	-0.0008*** (0.0000)
Age*Time	0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000*** (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Married	0.1277*** (0.0016)	0.1236*** (0.0029)	0.1298*** (0.0019)
Married*Time	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Region (Ref=New England)			
Middle Atlantic	0.0379*** (0.0029)		0.0376*** (0.0029)
East North Central	-0.0120*** (0.0028)		-0.0134*** (0.0028)
West North Central	-0.1196*** (0.0031)		-0.1199*** (0.0031)
South Atlantic	-0.0486*** (0.0028)	-0.0092** (0.0029)	
East South Central	-0.1406*** (0.0037)	-0.1013*** (0.0032)	
West South Central	-0.0333*** (0.0033)		
Mountain	-0.0413*** (0.0031)		-0.0412*** (0.0031)
Pacific	0.1456*** (0.0031)		0.1493*** (0.0031)
Middle Atlantic*Time	-0.0010*** (0.0002)		-0.0009*** (0.0002)
East North Central*Time	-0.0013*** (0.0002)		-0.0013*** (0.0002)
West North Central*Time	0.0001 (0.0002)		0.0001 (0.0002)
South Atlantic*Time	0.0010*** (0.0002)		
East South Central*Time	0.0007* (0.0003)		
West South Central*Time	-0.0030***	-0.0037***	

	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	
Mountain*Time	-0.0010*** (0.0002)		-0.0010*** (0.0002)
Pacific*Time	-0.0042*** (0.0002)		-0.0042*** (0.0002)
Central city	0.0207*** (0.0018)	0.0462*** (0.0032)	0.0038 (0.0022)
Central city*Time	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0002)
Public sector	-0.0416*** (0.0021)	-0.0056 (0.0037)	-0.0569*** (0.0026)
Public sector*Time	-0.0009*** (0.0002)	-0.0020*** (0.0003)	-0.0004* (0.0002)
Manufacturing	0.1236*** (0.0017)	0.1242*** (0.0031)	0.1232*** (0.0020)
Manufacturing*Time	-0.0024*** (0.0001)	-0.0023*** (0.0002)	-0.0025*** (0.0002)
Occupation (Ref=Manager)			
Manager	-0.0411*** (0.0028)	-0.0077 (0.0052)	-0.0527*** (0.0032)
Professional	-0.0622*** (0.0030)	-0.0501*** (0.0056)	-0.0670*** (0.0036)
Technician	-0.2715*** (0.0036)	-0.2495*** (0.0067)	-0.2796*** (0.0043)
Clerk	-0.3163*** (0.0029)	-0.3065*** (0.0054)	-0.3196*** (0.0035)
Agriculture/Forestry	-0.3337*** (0.0116)	-0.3608*** (0.0194)	-0.3107*** (0.0144)
Craft	-0.1421*** (0.0026)	-0.1281*** (0.0047)	-0.1453*** (0.0031)
Operator	-0.2855*** (0.0029)	-0.2711*** (0.0052)	-0.2897*** (0.0035)
Elem Worker	-0.4129*** (0.0031)	-0.4032*** (0.0057)	-0.4135*** (0.0037)
Manager*Time	0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0007 (0.0004)	0.0006* (0.0002)
Professional*Time	-0.0013*** (0.0002)	-0.0016*** (0.0004)	-0.0011*** (0.0003)
Technician*Time	-0.0031*** (0.0003)	-0.0031*** (0.0005)	-0.0030*** (0.0003)
Clerk*Time	0.0008*** (0.0002)	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0010*** (0.0002)
Agri/Forestry*Time	0.0037*** (0.0009)	0.0036* (0.0015)	0.0033** (0.0011)
Craft*Time	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0019*** (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0002)
Operator*Time	-0.0006** (0.0002)	-0.0005 (0.0004)	-0.0007** (0.0003)
Elem Worker*Time	0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Union	0.2283*** (0.0018)	0.2528*** (0.0036)	0.2200*** (0.0021)
Union*Time	-0.0027*** (0.0001)	-0.0044*** (0.0003)	-0.0021*** (0.0002)
Constant	1.9773*** (0.0036)	1.9727*** (0.0058)	1.9631*** (0.0040)
Adj_R^2	0.4139	0.4214	0.4050
N	1195382	359516	835866

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two tailed test)

Appendix Table 2. Changes in the Effects of being Black Men on Log Hourly Wage over Time Compared to Non-Hispanic White Men by Various Definitions of the South, 1983 to 2009^{ab}

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control Variables^c				
Black		o	o	o
Education/Age			o	o
Marriage			o	o
Central City			o	o
Market Sector				o
Occupation				o
Union				o
I. Deep South (AL, GA, LA, MS, SC)				
Time	0.0053*** (0.0002)	0.0047*** (0.0003)	0.0046*** (0.0007)	0.0055*** (0.0008)
Black		-0.3614*** (0.0075)	-0.2741*** (0.0064)	-0.2250*** (0.0063)
Black*Time		0.0030*** (0.0006)	0.0034*** (0.0005)	0.0028*** (0.0005)
Adj_R^2	0.0055	0.0763	0.3776	0.4355
N	80566	80566	80566	80566
II. Seven Originally Seceded States to Form Confederate State of America (AL, GA, LA, MS, SC, FL, TX)				
Time	0.0043*** (0.0002)	0.0040*** (0.0002)	0.0033*** (0.0006)	0.0049*** (0.0006)
Black		-0.3625*** (0.0059)	-0.2539*** (0.0050)	-0.2006*** (0.0049)
Black*Time		0.0025*** (0.0004)	0.0028*** (0.0004)	0.0022*** (0.0004)
Adj_R^2	0.0033	0.0594	0.3631	0.4227
N	172033	172033	172033	172033
III. Dixie: Eleven Confederate States of American (SC, MS, FL, AL, GA, LA, TX, VA, AR, NC, TN)				
Time	0.0047*** (0.0001)	0.0045*** (0.0002)	0.0032*** (0.0005)	0.0047*** (0.0005)
Black		-0.3318*** (0.0048)	-0.2391*** (0.0041)	-0.1900*** (0.0040)
Black*Time		0.0018*** (0.0004)	0.0023*** (0.0003)	0.0019*** (0.0003)
Adj_R^2	0.0040	0.0520	0.3615	0.4213
N	268114	268114	268114	268114

Notes: ^a. To save space, only the coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time, and the model R² values are reported; ^b. Other coefficients are omitted from the table; ^c. Control variables include interactions of the listed variables with Time. The four education variables are dummies (ref=BA). Age variables are Age and Age². Geographic variables are the nine regions and Central City (ref=Non-central-city). Market sector variables are Public Sector (ref=Private Sector) and Manufacturing Sector (ref=Non-manufacturing Sector). Occupations consist of nine broadly defined ISCO-88 categories (ref=Managers).

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two-tailed test)

Appendix Table 3. Changes in the Effects of being Black Men on Log Hourly Wage over Time Compared to Non-Hispanic White Men for Sub-Regions in the South, 1983 to 2009^{ab}

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control Variables^c				
Black		o	o	o
Education/Age			o	o
Marriage			o	o
Central City			o	o
Market Sector				o
Occupation				o
Union				o
IV. South Atlantic (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV)				
Time	0.0063*** (0.0002)	0.0059*** (0.0002)	0.0041*** (0.0004)	0.0051*** (0.0005)
Black		-0.2850*** (0.0054)	-0.1991*** (0.0046)	-0.1532*** (0.0045)
Black*Time		0.0021*** (0.0004)	0.0020*** (0.0003)	0.0015*** (0.0003)
Adj_R^2	0.0074	0.0428	0.3625	0.4239
N	203265	203265	203265	203265
V. East South Central (AL, KY, MS, TN)				
Time	0.0043*** (0.0003)	0.0038*** (0.0003)	0.0049*** (0.0007)	0.0053*** (0.0008)
Black		-0.3269*** (0.0098)	-0.2580*** (0.0083)	-0.2168*** (0.0080)
Black*Time		0.0031*** (0.0007)	0.0039*** (0.0006)	0.0035*** (0.0006)
Adj_R^2	0.0038	0.0475	0.3472	0.4167
N	64752	64752	64752	64752
VI. West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX)				
Time	0.0009*** (0.0002)	0.0011*** (0.0003)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0014 (0.0008)
Black		-0.3075*** (0.0097)	-0.2283*** (0.0082)	-0.1725*** (0.0079)
Black*Time		0.0005 (0.0007)	0.0016** (0.0006)	0.0011* (0.0006)
Adj_R^2	0.0001	0.0331	0.3433	0.4109
N	91499	91499	91499	91499

Notes: ^a. To save space, only the coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time, and the model R² values are reported; ^b. Other coefficients are omitted from the table; ^c. Control variables include interactions of the listed variables with Time. The four education variables are dummies (ref=BA). Age variables are Age and Age². Geographic variables are the nine regions and Central City (ref=Non-central-city). Market sector variables are Public Sector (ref=Private Sector) and Manufacturing Sector (ref=Non-manufacturing Sector). Occupations consist of nine broadly defined ISCO-88 categories (ref=Managers).

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two-tailed test)

Appendix Table 4. Changes in the Effects of being Black Men on the Percentile of Hourly Wage over Time Compared to Non-Hispanic White Men, 1983 to 2009^{ab}

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Control Variables^c				
Black		o	o	o
Education/Age			o	o
Marriage			o	o
Geographic Variable			o	o
Market Sector				o
Occupation				o
Union				o
I. Total				
Time	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0009*** (0.0001)	0.0014*** (0.0001)
Black		-0.1417*** (0.0017)	-0.0927*** (0.0014)	-0.0751*** (0.0014)
Black*Time		0.0002 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Adj_R^2	0.0000	0.0185	0.3562	0.4296
N	1195382	1195382	1195382	1195382
II. South Region				
Time	0.0013*** (0.0001)	0.0011*** (0.0001)	0.0012*** (0.0002)	0.0018*** (0.0002)
Black		-0.1604*** (0.0023)	-0.1152*** (0.0019)	-0.0908*** (0.0018)
Black*Time		0.0011*** (0.0002)	0.0010*** (0.0001)	0.0008*** (0.0001)
Adj_R^2	0.0011	0.0377	0.3676	0.4348
N	359516	359516	359516	359516
III. Other Regions				
Time	-0.0006*** (0.0000)	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	0.0005*** (0.0001)	0.0007*** (0.0001)
Black		-0.0707*** (0.0026)	-0.0586*** (0.0022)	-0.0535*** (0.0020)
Black*Time		-0.0024*** (0.0002)	-0.0015*** (0.0002)	-0.0010*** (0.0001)
Adj_R^2	0.0003	0.0063	0.3444	0.4212
N	835866	835866	835866	835866

Notes: ^a. To save space, only the coefficients of Time, Black, and Black*Time, and the model R² values are reported; ^b. Other coefficients are omitted from the table; ^c. Control variables include interactions of the listed variables with Time. The four education variables are dummies (ref=BA). Age variables are Age and Age². Geographic variables are the nine regions and Central City (ref=Non-central-city). Market sector variables are Public Sector (ref=Private Sector) and Manufacturing Sector (ref=Non-manufacturing Sector). Occupations consist of nine broadly defined ISCO-88 categories (ref=Managers). South Atlantic is the reference region for South, New England for Other Regions. New England is also the reference for Total.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Two-tailed test)